Keywords :
Eavesdropping attacks; jamming attacks; malicious reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS); pilot contamination attacks (PCA); sixth-generation (6G); Jamming attacks; Malicious reconfigurable intelligent surface; Pilot contamination attack; Pilot contaminations; Propagation environment; Reconfigurable; Security threats; Signal coverage; Sixth-generation (6g); Signal Processing; Information Systems; Hardware and Architecture; Computer Science Applications; Computer Networks and Communications; Security; 6G mobile communication; Communication system security; Jamming; Interference; Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces; Eavesdropping; Optimization; Internet of Things; Contamination
Abstract :
[en] Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs) are emerging as a transformative technology for sixth-generation (6G) wireless networks. They enable dynamic manipulation of the propagation environment to enhance signal coverage, mitigate interference, and improve spectral and energy efficiencies. However, this flexibility introduces significant security vulnerabilities when RISs are maliciously controlled. This study explores the threats posed by such RISs, focusing on their potential to compromise the security and integrity of 6G networks. From an adversarial perspective, we analyze key attack vectors, including sophisticated jamming attacks that disrupt communication, eavesdropping attacks that intercept communications, and pilot contamination attacks that impair channel estimation accuracy, all contributing to severe performance degradation. For each attack, we detail the underlying mechanisms and adversarial optimization strategies designed to maximize impact. A case study quantifies the practical effects of these malicious RIS-based attacks in a simulated 6G network scenario. This research emphasizes the critical need for robust defense mechanisms and proposes essential research directions to address the evolving threats from malicious RISs, ensuring the security of 6G networks.
Funding text :
Received 4 March 2025; revised 25 April 2025; accepted 9 May 2025. Date of publication 15 May 2025; date of current version 25 July 2025. This work was supported in part by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) Grant funded by the Korea Government (MSIT) under Grant RS-2025-00514779, and in part by the Korea University Grant. (Corresponding authors: Heejung Yu; Taejoon Kim.) Waqas Khalid is with the Institute of Industrial Technology, Korea University, Sejong 30019, Republic of Korea (e-mail: waqas283@korea.ac.kr; waqas283@gmail.com).
Scopus citations®
without self-citations
0