1 Julien Chaisse, Hong Kong as an International Economic Actor 1 (Hart 2024).
2 Article 5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law.
3 Chaisse, supra n. 1, at 2.
4 See ibid., at 46 et seq.
5 For example, Hong Kong is a member of the Asian Development Bank which is an important Asian forum for investment and development that subsequently established the Asia-Pacific Tax Hub in 2021. Chaisse, supra n. 1, at 67.
6 Ibid., at 57.
7 Ibid., at 85.
8 Hong Kong concluded fifty-five double tax treaties; see ibid., at 128.
9 Ibid., at 145.
10 Ibid., at 199.
11 Ibid., at 200
12 At least whenever it deals with cross-border topics which is clearly the case for international economic law.
13 See for instance, the complexity of most recent tax measures such as the OECD Pillar Two implementation and their fit in the existing legal framework: see e.g., Daniela Hohenwarter & Gunter Mayr, Pillar Two and BEFIT: Shocks and Opportunities for the EU Internal Market, 64 Eur. Tax’n 437–448 (2024), doi: 10.59403/3h9cbv4; Antonio Tomassini & Marica De Rosa, Uncertainties Hold Back Achievement of OECD Pillar 2 Goals, 51 Intertax 183–190 (2023), doi: 10.54648/TAXI2023014; Cedric Döllefeld et al., Tax Administrative Guidance: A Proposal for Simplifying Pillar Two, 50 Intertax 231–246 (2022), doi: 10.54648/TAXI2022019; or the large amount of singled-out regulatory pieces that attempt to fit a given economic reality with a sort of ‘puzzle’ compiled over the years as is the case in the regulation of financial markets; see on this: European Financial Regulation: Levelling the Cross-Sectoral Playing Field (Veerle Colaert, Danny Busch & Thomas Incalza eds, Bloomsbury 2019).
14 Regarding the important academic (and interdisciplinary) debate on how and to what extent to regulate, please refer to standard works such as those of Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 557–629 (1992), doi: 10.2307/1372840; Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974), doi: 10.1086/467515; Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211–1254 (2003), doi: 10.2307/3312889.
