The ECB’s Evolving Mandate and High Independence: An Undemocratic Mix

HÖGENAUER, Anna-Lena; MENDES, Joana

doi:10.17645/pag.9811

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The ECB’s Evolving Mandate and High Independence: An Undemocratic Mix

HÖGENAUER, Anna-Lena; MENDES, Joana

2025 • In Politics and Governance, 13

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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/64469

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10.17645/pag.9811

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Keywords :

European Central Bank; European Parliament; accountability; transparency; mandate; independence

Abstract :

[en] After over a decade of crisis, the ECB’s functions have expanded considerably. The ECB’s activities during the eurozone crisis, new debates on the ECB’s role in supporting political goals like the fight against climate change, and its participation in geopolitical stand-offs have overcome the fiction of a technocratic role that can be allocated to an independent institution with few constraints to democracy. We highlight how the ECB’s mandate has been (re)interpreted while eschewing the impact of this change on its independence. Drawing on the contributions to this thematic issue, we also argue that the limited legal and political accountability does not match the evolving mandate. In particular, we contrast the voluntary mechanisms of accountability created in the past years and the judicial endorsement of the expansion of the ECB’s mandate.

Disciplines :

European & international law
Political science, public administration & international relations

Author, co-author :

HÖGENAUER, Anna-Lena ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) > Political Science

MENDES, Joana ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Law (DL)

External co-authors :

Language :

English

Title :

The ECB’s Evolving Mandate and High Independence: An Undemocratic Mix

Publication date :

30 January 2025

Journal title :

Politics and Governance

eISSN :

2183-2463

Publisher :

Cogitatio

Volume :

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/viewFile/9811/4196

Name of the research project :

U-AGR-6006 - IAS EMULEG - MENDES Joana

Funders :

Institute of Advanced Studies

Available on ORBilu :

since 13 March 2025

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