Political Science and International Relations; Law
Résumé :
[en] Following decades long political and legal uncertainty, several spacefaring States passed national laws asserting (or reaffirming) private rights on resources extracted in space. This “bottom-up” approach is now shaping the fundamentals of international norms and rules. While the so-called “Artemis Bloc” and the US legislative and policy-making efforts have been examined extensively, what is missing is an in-depth analysis of the stance and response of other major spacefaring nations. This article contributes to the scholarship by studying China’s perspective. The article considers the ongoing proliferation of national laws and policy-making efforts and the increased pace of commercialisation in the space sector as the driving force of international law-making. It then notes the absence of a clear-cut national legislation in China governing space operations linked to resource extraction from celestial bodies. The paper argues that China, as a major space-faring and a developing country, is poised to have an assertive voice in international space law-making. It shows how a stronger national legal framework, coupled with international law and policy-making efforts, can elevate China’s contribution in international space law-in particular regarding space resource extraction and utilisation.
Disciplines :
Droit européen & international
Auteur, co-auteur :
ÜNÜVAR, Günes ; University of Luxembourg > Luxembourg Centre for European Law (LCEL) > LCEL Research
SU, Xueji; University of Macao > Faculty of Law
Co-auteurs externes :
yes
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
International Legal Governance of Space Resources and the Role of National Frameworks: The Case of China
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Simone McCarthy, China’s Chang’e-6 moon mission returns to Earth with historic far side samples (CNN.com, 25 June 2024) (https://edition.cnn.com/2024/06/25/china/china-change-6-moon-mission-return-scn-intl-hnk/index.html).
Mike Wall, Not just Artemis: China and Russia Plan to Put Boots on the Moon, too (Space.com, 3 September 2022) (https://www.space.com/china-russia-moonbase-ilrs).
Andrew Jones, Chinese Space Launch Startups Attract a Frenzy of Investment (SpaceNews, 10 February 2022) (https://spacenews.com/chinese-space-launch-startups-attract-a-frenzy-of-investment/);
See also, Fabio Tronchetti and Hao Liu, The 2019 Notice on Promoting the Systematic and Orderly Development of Commercial Carrier Rockets: The First Step Towards Regulating Private Space Activities in China, 57 Space Policy (2021).
Simone McCarthy, China sends first civilian astronaut to space as Shenzou-16 blasts off (CNN.com, 29 May 2023) (https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/29/china/china-shenzhou-manned-spaceship-launch-intl-hnk/index.html).
Harvard Business Review, The Commercial Space Age is Here: Private Space Travel is Just the Beginning, 2021 (https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-spaceage-is-here);
See also, Svetla Ben-Itzhak, Companies are Commercializing Outer Space: Do Government Programs Still Matter? (The Washington Post, 11 January 2022) (https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/11/companies-are-commercializing-outer-space-do-government-programs-still-matter/) .
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967) (OST), art. I.
See, for instance, Li Juqian, Progressing Towards New National Space Law: Current Legal Status and Recent Developments in Chinese Space Law and its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities, 35 J Space Law (2009);
Xiaodan Wu, China’s Space Law: Rushing to the Finish Line of its Marathon, 46 Space Policy (2018), 38;
Guozhu Gao, Issues on the National Space Legislation Concerning Chinese Space Activities and Prospects for the Future, 13 J Beijing Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition) (2011), 85;
Yun Zhao, National Space Law in China: An Overview of the Current Situation and Outlook for the Future (Brill 2015);
Shengli Jiang and Yu Zhao, China’s National Space Station: Opportunities, Challenges, and Solutions for International Cooperation, 57 Space Policy (2021), 9.
Further see Max Zhang and Xiaonan Yang, China’s Emerging Commercial Space Industry: Current Developments, Legislative Challenges, and Regulatory Solutions, 202 Acta Astronautica (2023), 9.
Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AJIL (2004), 43;
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 Penn State ILR (2006), 745;
Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 Stanford Journal of International Law (1996), 65.
See for a general taxonomy of conceptualization of transnational law in Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 Law & Social Inquiry (2012), 229.
Shaffer, ibid.
Fabio Tronchetti, Title IV – Space Resource Exploration and Utilization of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act: A Legal and Political Assessment, 41 Air & Space Law 41 (2016);
Patrick-André Salin, An Overview of US Commercial Space Legislation and Policies: Present and Future, 27 Air & Space Law (2002), 209.
Jim Bridenstine and Mike N. Gold, International Participation in Artemis - An Update from NASA (FPC Briefing, 13 October 2020) (https://2017-2021.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/international-participation-in-artemis-an-up date-from-nasa/).
Rick Tumlinson, Missing the moment history happens: The media and ‘NewSpace’ (op-ed) (Space.com, 12 January 2023) (https://www.space.com/news pace-media-missing-the-moment).
There are generally five treaties, collectively called the Space Treaties in this article, which are considered to be the fundamental documents on international space law and governance: OST, above n. 7;
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968) (The “Rescue Agreement”);
the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972) (The “Liability Convention”);
the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1976) (The “Registration Convention”);
the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1984) (The “Moon Treaty”). The Moon Treaty failed to garner the support enjoyed by the other four Space Treaties, with 11 signatories as of August 2024.
This is clearly observable in the provisions of the Space Treaties and in particular the OST, where the focus is on the activities of states.
See, for example, Jakub Pražák, Dual-use conundrum: Towards the weaponization of outer space?, 187 Acta Astronautica (2021), 397-405.
Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Clarendon 1986), 103;
Detlev Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 Harvard LR (1970), 741;
Peter Muchlinski, Corporations in International Law, in Rudiger € Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia PIL (OUP 2010).
See in general, John Gerard Ruggie, Multinationals as global institution: Power, authority and relative autonomy, 12 Regulation & Governance (2018), 317.
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (adopted 29 November 1969, entered into force 19 June 1975) 973 UNTS 3;
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (adopted 21 May 1963, entered into force 12 November 1977) 1063 UNTS 265.
See also, Miriam Mafessanti, Responsibility for Environmental Damage under International Law: Can MNCs Bear the Burden? … And How?, 17 Buffalo ELJ (2009-2010), 90;
Gunther € Handl, Territorial sovereignty and the problem of transnational pollution, 69 AJIL (1975), 50;
Regarding other fields of international law see, for instance, Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 Yale LJ (2001), 443;
Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. I (OUP 2002) 767, 779.
OST, above n. 7, art. VI.
Michael Byers and Aaaron Boley, Who Owns Outer Space? International Law, Astrophysics, and the Sustainable Development of Space (Cambridge University Press, 2023), 141.
Frans von der Dunk, Advanced Introduction to Space Law (Elgar, 2020), 9.
US Code, Title 51 - National and Commercial Space Programs (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title51/pdf/USCODE-2011-title51.pdf).
Among developed, Western nations who explicitly favour multilateral solutions has been Belgium. See, for example, Contribution from Belgium to the discussion under UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee on item “General exchange of views on potential legal models for activities in exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources” (Fifty-sixth session of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Document No. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.19, 28 March 2017) (https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2017/aac_105c_22017crp/aac_105c_ 22017crp_19_0_html/AC1 05_C2_2017_CRP19E.pdf), 2. It should however be noted that Belgium joined the Artemis Accords in January 2024.
One possible (and much less explored) way to internationalise these national legal and political frameworks could be through customary international law, provided there are enough national laws incorporating an emergent interpretation of a general or ambiguous international law rule. See, for example, Güneş Ünüvar, Can National Laws on Space Resources Serve as Evidence of Customary International Law? (Opinio Juris, 8 November 2022) (https://opiniojuris.org/2022/11/08/can-na tional-laws-on-space-resources-serve-as-evidence-of-customary-international-law/).
The Vancouver Recommendations on Space Mining, the comprehensive product of an expert gathering organised by the Outer Space Institute, “encourages the establishment of a mandatory benefits sharing mechanism that includes, but is not limited to, sharing of monetary benefits, for example through an international fund.” (Recommendation VII (20)).
The Moon Village Principles, released after the Second International Workshop and Symposium of the Moon Village Association, also advocates benefit sharing “through all feasible means” but takes a rather conservative stance while citing an example of such “means” (Principle 2).
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1280th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 13 December 1963 (https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_18_1962E.pdf).
UNCOPUOS, Letter dated 11 July 1966 Addressed to the Chairman of the Legal Sub-committee by the representative of the USSR (A/AC.105/C.2/L.13)(https:// www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_L013E.pdf).
UNCOPUOS, Interim Report by the Chairman (6 September 1966, A/AC.105/C.2/ L.16) (https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_L016E_and_AC105_C2_L016corr1E.pdf).
J.I. Gabrynowicz, The “Province” and “Heritage” of Mankind Reconsidered: A New Beginning, The Second Conference on Lunar Bases and Space Activities of the 21st Century, Proceedings from a conference held in Houston, TX, April 5-7 1988. Edited by W. W. Mendell, NASA Conference Publication 3166, 1992, 691;
citing Robinson and White, 1986, 187(https://articles.adsabs.harvard.edu//full/ 1992lbsa.conf..691G/0000692.000.html).
UNCLOS, pursuant to its Article 136, designates the Area, defined as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” under Article 1, as the common heritage of mankind.
OST, above n. 7, art. I.
OST, art. II.
Rossana Deplano, The Artemis Accords: Evolution or Revolution in International Space Law?, 70 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 799, 810 (2021).
The Moon Treaty, above n. 15, art. 11.
Bin Cheng, The Moon Treaty: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies within the Solar System other than the Earth, Studies in International Space Law (1997), 357-380, 374; reproduced from first publication at 33 CLP (1980), 213-237.
Article 11(5) of the Moon Treaty reads: “States Parties to this agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible. This provision shall be implemented in accordance with article 18 of this Agreement.” Article 18 provides a rendez-vous arrangement to revisit Article 11(5) with regard to technological developments.
Irmgard Marboe, Space Resources and Property Rights—Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches, in Michael Lysander Fremuth, Jörn Griebel, and Robert Heinsch (eds), Natural Resources and International Law—Developments and Challenges: A Liber Amicorum in Honour of Stephan Hobe (Nomos, 2021) 231, 249.
What “benefit sharing” exactly captures is not clear. It often encapsulates general commitments, but notably excludes the sharing of financial benefits. See Kiran Mohan Vazhapully, Space Law at the Crossroads: Contextualizing the Artemis Accords and the Space Resources Executive Order (Opinio Juris, 22 July 2020).
Also see Building Blocks for the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities: A Commentary, Olavo de Bittencourt Neto, Mahulena Hofmann, Tanja Masson-Zwan, and Dimitra Stefoudi (eds) (Eleven, 2020), 74-79. Building Block 13 concerns the sharing of benefits.
Ünüvar, above n. 29.
Luxembourg Space Agency, International Space Law (space-agency.public.lu/en/ agency/legal-framework.html);
UAE Space Agency, International Space Law (space. gov.ae/Page/20122/20216/International-Law).
US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ90/PLAW-114publ90.pdf);
Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 (www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr1508/BILLS-114hr1508rh.pdf).
§51302. Commercialization of space resource exploration and utilization (www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr1508/BILLS-114hr1508rh.pdf).
§ 51303. Legal framework.
Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace, English translation (space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/legal-framework/law_space_resources_english_translation.html).
Federal Law No. 12 of 2019 on the Regulation of the Space Sector.
Ibid., art. 1.
Ibid., art. 4.
The Emirati Federal Law No. 12 of 2019 on the Regulation of the Space Sector, arts. 14 and 18. The law sets as one of its objectives as follows: “Stimulating investment and encouraging private and academic sector participation in the Space Sector and related activities”.
Also see Cabinet Resolution No. (19) of 2023 Concerning the Space Resources Regulations (https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/legislations/1634/download).
Act No. 83 of 2021 on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources, art. 2.
Act No. 83 of 2021 on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources,, art. 2(ii).
Act No. 83 of 2021 on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources,, art. 5.
Act No. 83 of 2021 on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources,, arts. 6(1) and (2).
Act No. 83 of 2021 on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources,, art. 7(1).
Space Resources, Artemis Accords, Section 10 (www.nasa.gov/specials/artemisaccords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf).
Alexander Stirn, Do NASA’s Lunar Exploration Rules Violate Space Law? (Scientific American, 12 November 2020), quoting Stephan Hobe (www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-nasas-lunar-exploration-rules-violate-space-law/).
For example, the Japanese Act No. 83 consistently refers to international law.
The original French text reads “en conformité avec le droit international”. See Conseil d’Ètat Luxembourgeois, CE 51.987 No. dossier parl.: 7093, 7 April 2017.
CE, 6, authors’ translation.
Ünüvar, above n. 29.
Mahulena Hofmann and PJ Blount, Emerging Commercial Uses of Space: Regulation Reducing Risks, 19 Journal of World Investment & Trade 1001, 1006 (2018).
Louis Brennan, How Luxembourg is positioning itself to be the centre of space business (The Conversation, 16 July 2019) (https://theconversation.com/how-lux embourg-is-positioning-itself-to-be-the-centre-of-space-business-120436).
Olga Yeshchuk and Anna Vasina, Chinese Space Law: Problems and Areas of Reforming, 3 Advanced Space Law 141 (2019).
Wu, above n. 8.
State Scientific and Technological Commission of The People’s Republic of China, 1956-1967 Nian Kexue Jishu Fazhan Yuanjing Guihua Gangyao [Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology during 1956-1967], promulgated in 1956.
Gao, above n. 8.
Zhao, above n. 8.
Shirley A. Kan, China: Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and Defense Industries, CRS Report for Congress, 1997.
See The State Council, State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (www.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/06/content_281474992893468.htm).
More specifically, the SASTIND carries out the following functions: developing production and technology policy, developing plans for the nuclear, aerospace, aviation, shipping and ordinance industries, and implementing industry management; research on developing policies, laws and regulations on defence industry and dual-use conversions; formulating rules on defence industry and industry management. Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui Zhineng Peizhi, Neishe Jigou He Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding [Regulations on the Functional Allocation, Internal Institutions and Staffing of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense(dissolved)], promulgated in 1998.
China National Space Administration, para. 2 (www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771918/index.html).
About CASA: Company Profile, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, para. 2 (english.spacechina.com/n16421/n17138/n17229/c127066/ content.html).
Zhao, above n. 8, 24.
Zhao, above n. 8, 33.
Zhao, above n. 8, 35.
Yongliang Qi, A Study of Aerospace Legislation in China, 33 Journal of Space Law (2007), 406.
On a comprehensive analysis of China’s fragmented space legislation, see Guozhu Gao, Woguo Hangtian Fa Lifa Suo Yituo De Guonei Falv Huanjing Fenxi [An Analysis of the Domestic Legal Situation Relied on in the Legislation of China’s Space Law], 4 Xibei Gongye Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Northwestern Polytechnical University] (2019) 71.
Order No. 6 of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence of the People’s Republic of China (dissolved) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Registration Measures) (“Kongjian Wuti Dengji Guanli Banfa”).
Order No. 12 of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence of the People’s Republic of China (dissolved)(“Minyong Hangtian Fashe Xiangmu Xukezheng Guanli Zanxing Banfa”).
Notice of the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense on strengthening the management of civil space launch project licenses (“Guofang Kegong Ju Guanyu Jiaqiang Minyong Hangtian Fashe Xiangmu Xukezheng Guanli Youguan Shixiang de Tongzhi”), 6 March 2023 (https://www.sastind.gov.cn/n10086167/n10086221/c10129160/content.html).
Ke Gong Fa [2002] No. 534, 18 August 2002(“Guofang Keji Gongye Minyong Zhuanxiang Keyan Guanli Banfa”).
Other regulations and departmental rules include Interim Measures for the Management of National Civil Satellite Remote Sensing Data, Ke Gong Yi Si [2018] No. 1866 (“Guojia Minyong Yaogan Shuju Guanli Zanxing Banfa”), Interim Measures for the Management of Civil Satellite Projects, promulgated in 2016, Ke Gong Yi Si [2016] No. 986 (“Minyong Weixing Gongcheng Guanli Zanxing Banfa”), Notice on Promoting the Standardized and Orderly Development of Commercial Launch Vehicles, Ke Gong Yi Si [20189] No. 647 (“Guanyu Cujin Shangyr Yunzai Huojian Guifa Youxu Fazhan de Tongzhi”), and Notice on Matters Concerning Strengthening the Administration of Licenses for Civil Space Launch Projects, promulgated in 2023 (“Guofang Kegong Ju Guanyu Jiaqiang Minyong Hangtian Fashe Xiangmu Xukezheng Guanli Youguan Shixiang de Tongzhi”).
State Council Order No. 556, 12 May 2009 (“Jichu Cehui Tiaoli”).
The Administrative Measures, above n.88, and the Licensing Measures, above n.89.
The Regulation on Telecommunications of 2000, Decree No. 291, amended in 2014 (“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dianxin Tiaoli”).
China’s export controls are regulated under a body of law and administrative regulations. Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 58 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 2020 (“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chukou Guanzhi Fa”);
Regulations on Export Control of Military Products, first released in 1997 and revised in 2002 (“Junpin Chukou Guanli Tiaoli”);
Administrative Regulations on Export Control of Missiles and Missiles Related Items and Technologies of 2002 (“Daoda ji Xiangguan Wuxiang he Jishu Chukou Guanli Tiaoli”);
Regulations on Export Control of Nuclear Products of 2006 (“He Chukou Guanzhi Tiaoli”);
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Controlled Chemicals of 1995 (“Jiankong Huaxuepin Guanzhi Tiaoli”);
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Dual-use Items and Related Technologies Export, revised in 2007 (“He Liangyongpin ji Xiangguan Jishu Chukou Guanzhi Tiaoli”) and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologie (“Shengwu Liangyongpin ji Xiangguan Shebei he Jishu Chukou Guanzhi Tiaoli”).
Keyuan Zou, International Law in the Chinese Domestic Context, 44 Valparaiso University Law Review (2010), 935;
Bjorn Ahl, Chinese Law and International Treaties, 39 Hong Kong LJ (2009), 741.
Hanqin Xue and Qian Jin, International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System, 8 Chinese JIL (2009), 299.
Registration Measures, art. 1.
UNCOPUOS, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, UN Doc. A/62/20 (2007). These guidelines suggest the members take domestic measures, “through national mechanisms or through their own applicable mechanisms, to ensure that these guidelines are implemented, to the greatest extent feasible, through space debris mitigation practices and procedures.”
The Chinese government released the first draught of the System Table of the Space Debris Standards Framework a year later. This document outlines explicit guidelines for relevant space debris standards when Chinese entities conduct space activities. Another pertinent legislation is the Interim Measures on Space Debris Mitigation and Protective Management (Interim Measures), promulgated by SASTIND on 1 December 2009.
See for details in Shouping Li, The Establishment of National Mechanism on Space Debris Mitigation, 21 Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (2008), 37.
Measures for the Management of Space Debris Mitigation and Protection, promulgated in Decembr 2015 (“Kongjian Suipian Jianhuan ji Fanghu Guanli Banfa”). The requirements are also raised in other departmental rules.
See also Marc Carns, Orbital Debris Prevention and Mitigation Efforts Among Major Space Actors: Commonalities and the Search for Customary International Law (Studies in Space Law) (Brill 2023), 175.
Li, above n. 8.
Li, 468.
Zhao, above n. 8, 222 ff.
See also, Jianfeng Han, Review on Space Debris-related Legislation and Views on Chinese Space Legislation, 23 The Rule of Law Forum (2008), 83.
Li, above n. 8;
Guoyu Wang, Lun Zhongguo Hangtian Fa Lifa De Biyaoxing Yu Kexingxing [The Necessity and Viability of Chinese Space Legislation], 6 J Beijing Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition) (2012);
Haifa Zhao, Guanyu Zhongguo Kongjian Lifa De Ruogan Sikao [Some Thoughts on China’s Space Legislation], 5 Heilongjiang Social Science (2007).
Jian Yang, China Institute of Space Law Held its Annual Meeting in 2012, 1 Space Exploration (2013), 54.
First Announcement for 2013 APSCO Space Law & Policy Forum (www.apsco.int/AnnoucementOne.asp?ID=274).
China’s Space Activities, 2021 White Paper (28 January 2022), Section V para. (5).
Also see China’s Space Activities, 2000 White Paper (22 November 2000),
China’s Space Activities, 2006 White Paper (12 December 2006),
2011 White Paper (29 December 2011),
2016 White Paper (28 December 2016).
Fabio Tronchetti, Space Law and China (Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Planetary Science, February 2019), 9.
Notice on the issuance of the Medium- and Long-term Development Plan for National Civil Space Infrastructure (2015-2025), Fa Gai Gao Ji [2015] No. 2429, promulgated by National Development and Reform Commission in 2015.
2011 White Paper, above n.109, Section IV.
2021 White Paper, above n. 109.
2000 White Paper, above n. 109, Section I.
Minyang Nie, Space Privatization in China’s National Strategy of Military-Civilian Integration: An Appraisal of Critical Legal Challenges, 52 Space Policy (2020).
2021 White Paper, above n. 109, Section V, para. (4).
State Council, Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Innovation of Investment and Financing Mechanisms in Key Fields to Encourage Social Investment (16 November 2014) (https://lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=238643).
Foreign Investment Law of China, adopted on 15 March 2019, effective on 1 January 2020;
Implementing Regulation of the Foreign Investment Law of China, adopted on 26 December, effective on 1 January 2020,
Negative List for Foreign Investment, firstly published in 2017 and renewed annually. Investment restriction on satellite television broadcast ground receiving facilities was left from the 2021 version of the Negative List.
See also Gao, above n. 85, 72.
With regard to international treaties and its own participation in international dialogues, China has consistently portrayed itself in the White Papers as a proponent of equality, mutual benefit, mutual complementarity, and common development. See also Wu, above n. 8.
International Telecommunication Union Constitution and Convention (most recent edition; 2022) (http://handle.itu.int/11.1004/020.1000/5.23.61.en.100).
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO) (1971).
Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO) (1976).
China National Space Administration releases Statement on China's Aerospace Contribution to the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (Xinhua, 2019) (http://m.xinhuanet.com/2019-04/24/c_1124411073.htm).
UNCOPUOS, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its sixty-first session, 28 March - 8 April 2022, 6.
“The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the United Nations, which provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development.” About the Group of 77 (https://www.g77.org/doc/).
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Shen Jian at the Thematic Debate on Outer Space of the 78th Session of UNGA First Committee, 20 October 2023;
See also G77 and China Statement During the Sixty-First Session of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (G77 and China Statement), 28 March-8 April 2022, delivered by H.E. Azzeddine Farhane, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Morocco, on Agenda Item 12: General Exchange of Information on Non-Legally Binding United Nations Instruments on Outer Space.
UNCOPUOS, China’s General Statement, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its sixty-first session, 31 March 2022.
China’s Statement on Item 3: General exchange of views, 26 Session,1039th meeting, 22 March 2023 (https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/2023/Statements/22_PM/3_China_22_Mar_PM.pdf).
Xiaodan Wu, The International Lunar Research Station: China’s New Era of Space Cooperation and Its New Role in the Space Legal Order, (online) Space Policy (2022).
Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press 2008).
China’s Statement on Item 10: General exchange of views on potential legal models for activities in the exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources, 62nd Session of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 24 March 2023 (https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/2023/Statements/24_PM/10_China_21_Mar_AM_1.pdf).
China’s Statement on Item 3: General exchange of views, 62nd Session of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 22 March 2023 (https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/2023/Statements/24_PM/10_China_21_Mar_AM_1.pdf).
2021 White Paper, above n. 109.
International Lunar Research Station Guide for Partnership (ILRS): Guide for Partnership (ILRS), issued on 16 June 2021 (www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html);
Ling Xin, China’s Moon Ambitions Take Shape with Construction Road Map for Research Station, SCMP, 25 April 2023.
China and Russia to build lunar space station, BBC, 10 March 2021 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56342311);
Reportedly, the European Space Agency and the UAE Space Agency both have shown interest in ILRS but joined the US Lunar Gateway Program. See Sarwat Nasir, UAE joins Nasa space treaty as global plans to explore the Moon and Mars take shape, October 14, 2020 (https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/science/uae-joins-nasa-space-treaty-as-global-plansto-explore-the-moon-and-mars-take-shape-1.1093146).
Joint Statement between China National Space Administration and the State Space Corporation “Roscosmos” Regarding Cooperation for the Construction of the International Lunar Research Station, 29 April 2021, para. 1 https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6811967/content.html.
Wu, above n. 132, citing Jie Long, China’s Space Station Project and International Cooperation: Potential Models of Jurisdiction and Selected Legal Issues, 36 Space Policy 36 (2016), 37;
Jiang and Zhao, above n.8, 9.
Wu, ibid.
See for instance, Heng Wang, Selective Reshaping: China’s Paradigm Shift in International Economic Governance, 23 Journal of International Economic Law (2020);
Matthew S. Erie, Legal Systems Inside Out: American Legal Exceptionalism and China’s Dream of Legal Cosmopolitanism, University of Pennsylvania JIL, forthcoming.
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, 16 June 2014 (https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/201406/t20140 616_599726.html).
In this regard, China’s stance is predominantly congruent with that of Russia, in contrast to the stances taken by the UK and the US. The divergences propel the UN’ discourse regarding the prevention of an outer space arms race in opposite directions (https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3730.doc.htm).
CNSA, BRICS countries launch joint committee on space cooperation (26 May 2022) (https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6840322/content.html).
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) (http://www.apsco.int/).
APSCO, APSCO and UNOOSA Signed Cooperation Agreement in Space Legislation (APSCO News, 16 February 2022) (http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/NewsHighlights/2022-02-16/54-502-1.shtml).
Mark Williams Pontin, China’s Antisatellite Missile Test: Why? (MIT Technology Review, 8 March 2007) (https://www.technologyreview.com/2007/03/08/226350/chinas-antisatellite-missile-test-why/).
NASA Administrator Statement on Chinese Space Debris (www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-administrator-statement-on-chinese-space-debris).
Section 1340, United States Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (2011) (https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ10/PLAW112publ10.htm).
Submission by the Delegation of China to the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (A/AC.105/C.2/2024/CRP.5) (https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/space-resources/LSC2024/English_Chinas_submis sion_to_the_working_group_on_space_resources.pdf).
Ibid., 3.
See also Kevin Pollpeter, China’s space program: making China Strong, Rich, and Respected, 15 Asia Policy (2020) 12–18.
MIT Technology Review, China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US, 2021 (www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-privatecommercial-space-industry-dominance).
Hofmann and Blount, above n. 66.
CNSA, Rules for Management of International Cooperation in Lunar Samples and Scientific Data, promulgated on 2 August 2023 (https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c10086003/content.html).
