The norm of reasoning

[en] The paper presents and defends a new account of reasoning. Reasoning is essentially subject to a constitutive norm, the norm of following sufficient normative reasons. Instead of rule-following, following normative reasons is essential. After clarifying the view, three arguments in its support will be presented. They concern the scope of (correct) reasoning, the value of (correct) reasoning, and the relation between reasoning and treating a consideration as a reason. Two objections–concerning the knowledge norm of belief and cases of improperly treating a consideration as a reason–will be dealt with.

Disciplines :

Philosophy & ethics

Author, co-author :

HOFMANN, Frank ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Humanities (DHUM) > Philosophy

External co-authors :

Language :

English

Title :

The norm of reasoning

Publication date :

September 2024

Journal title :

Philosophical Explorations

ISSN :

1386-9795

eISSN :

1741-5918

Publisher :

Routledge

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Available on ORBilu :

since 22 September 2024

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