Art. 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR; art. 50 of the Charter; art. 54 CISA; legal certainty; ne bis in idem; reopening of case
Résumé :
[en] The principle of ne bis in idem, intrinsically linked to the concept of res iudicata, constitutes a fundamental cornerstone of criminal justice, ensuring protection against multiple prosecutions or punishments for the same offense. Nevertheless, the ever-evolving legal landscape has engendered extensive discussions concerning the potential reopening of criminal cases, particularly in light of novel evidentiary findings or fundamental procedural irregularities in the criminal proceedings at stake. This Article embarks upon a comprehensive and exhaustive inquiry into the intricate interplay between the re-examination of criminal proceedings and the ne bis in idem principle in Europe. By concentrating on key legal instruments, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA), this study aims at exploring the theoretical, legal, and human rights implications associated with such a course of action. At the heart of this analysis lies a meticulous examination of art. 4 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR, which serves as a pivotal benchmark governing the permissibility and justifiability of reopening criminal proceedings. Within this context, it will be demonstrated that, unfortunately, the interpretation of the latter provision by the Strasbourg Court – which provides for the minimum standards of protection of ne bis in idem in EU law – has not been consistent, creating potential issues concerning legal certainty and clarity that could undermine the essence of the said principle. Against this composite background, the primary objective of this Article is to illuminate the extent to which the principle of ne bis in idem may be rendered less stringent, in exceptional circumstances, to accommodate legitimate grounds warranting the reopening of criminal proceedings within the European legal framework.
Disciplines :
Droit pénal & procédure pénale Droit européen & international
Auteur, co-auteur :
BERNARDINI, Lorenzo ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Law (DL)
Co-auteurs externes :
no
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Reopening Criminal Proceedings and Ne Bis in Idem: Towards a Weaker Res Iudicata in Europe?
Date de publication/diffusion :
10 juillet 2024
Titre du périodique :
European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration
1 D Wolf, ‘I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standard for New Trial in False Testimony Cases’ (1985) MichLRev 1925.
2 AJ Flick, ‘Rapist’s “Confessions” could Reopen a Case’ (19 April 2005) Tucson Citizen tucsoncitizen.com.
3 E Pilkington, ‘Will Justice Finally be Done for Emmett Till? Family Hope a 65-year Wait May soon be Over’ (25 April 2020) The Guardian www.theguardian.com.
4 SE Garcia, ‘DNA Evidence Exonerates a Man of Murder After 20 Years in Prison’ (16 October 2018) The New York Times www.nytimes.com.
5 For a comprehensive analysis, see A Turmo, Res Iudicata in European Union Law (EU Law Live Press 2022).
6 K Malleson, ‘Appeals against Conviction and the Principle of Finality’ (1994) Journal of Law and Society 151, 158.
7 G Illuminati, ‘Cassazione o Terza Istanza’ in Associazione tra gli Studiosi del Processo Penale (ed.), Le impugnazioni penali. Evoluzione o involuzione? Controlli di merito e controlli di legittimità. Atti del Convegno (Palermo, 1–2 dicembre 2006) (Giuffré 2008) 352.
8 Case C-234/17 XC and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:853 para. 52.
9 This Article will solely refer to the concept of ne bis in idem within the criminal law sphere. For a broad analysis of the principle in the EU law, see inter alia JAE Vervaele, ‘Ne Bis in Idem: Towards a Transnational Constitutional Principle in the EU?’ (2013) Utrecht Law Review 211; B van Bockel, ‘The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the European Union Legal Order: Between Scope and Substance’ (2012) ERA Forum 325, and B van Bockel, The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in EU Law (Kluwer Law International 2010).
10 JAE Vervaele, ‘The Transnational Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the EU Mutual Recognition and Equivalent Protection of Human Rights’ (2005) Utrecht Law Review 100.
11 D Sarmiento, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ in B van Bockel (ed.), Ne Bis in Idem in Eu Law (Cambridge University Press 2016) 120.
12 M Luchtman, ‘The ECJ’s Recent Caselaw on Ne Bis in Idem: Implications for Law Enforcement in a Shared Legal Order’ (2018) CMLRev 1717, 1721.
13 G Coffey, ‘A History of the Common Law Double Jeopardy Principle: From Classical Antiquity to Modern Era’ (2022) Athens Journal of Law 253.
14 X Groussot and A Ericsson, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in the EU and ECHR Legal Orders: A Matter for Uniform Interpretation?’ in B van Bockel (ed.), Ne Bis in Idem In Eu Law cit. 55. As pointed out by M Fletcher, ‘The Problem of Multiple Criminal Prosecutions: Building an Effective EU Response’ (2007) Yearbook of European Law 33, 39, multiple prosecutions result per se in adverse consequences for the individual, e.g., duplicated expenditures on legal representation, coercive actions against personal and property rights, and psychological strains stemming from prolonged proceedings and the absence of conclusive outcomes.
15 S Coutts, Citizenship, Crime and Community in the European Union (Hart 2019) 157. In the same vein, P Oliver and T Bombois, ‘“Ne bis in idem” en droit européen: un principe à plusieurs variantes’ (2012) Journal de Droit Européen 266.
16 In this section, I will deal with the theoretical issues surrounding the vertical application of ne bis in idem, that is, the classical prohibition of double prosecution and punishment against the same individual for the same facts within a single domestic system. As will be explored in section III, there is also a horizontal application of ne bis in idem, that is, when the principle is applied between different legal orders (e.g., within the EU legal framework).
17 For an updated overview of the relevant European case-law, see P Rossi-Maccanico, ‘A Reasoned Approach to Prohibiting the Bis in Idem’ (2021) eucrim 266, 268–270. See also case C-117/20 bpost ECLI:EU:C:2022:202 and case C-151/20 Nordzucker and Others ECLI:EU:C:2022:203.
18 In this regard see S Montaldo, ‘A New Crack in the Wall of Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust: Ne Bis in Idem and the Notion of Final Decision Determining the Merits of the Case’ (2016) European Papers www.europeanpapers.eu 1183.
19 N Neagu, ‘The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the Interpretation of European Courts: Towards Uniform Interpretation’ (2012) LJIL 955.
20 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2012:340, opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, para. 70.
21 See ECtHR A and B v Norway App n. 24130/11 and 29758/11 [15 November 2016], dissenting opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque.
22 In this regard, see J Lelieur, ‘”Transnationalising” Ne Bis In Idem: How the Rule of Ne Bis In Idem Reveals the Principle of Personal Legal Certainty’ (2013) Utrecht Law Review 198, 199 ff and, similarly, S Mirandola and G Lasagni, ‘The European ne bis in idem at the Crossroads of Administrative and Criminal Law’ (2019) eucrim 126 and further references cited therein.
23 In this regard, M Luchtman, ‘The ECJ’s Recent Caselaw on Ne Bis in Idem’ cit. 1721 argued that “the importance one attaches to the specific rationales of the principle inevitably has consequences for its design and effects in a specific legal order”.
24 In this vein, case C-486/14 Kossowski ECLI:EU:C:2015:812, opinion of AG Bot, para. 37.
25 See inter alia D Sarmiento ‘Ne Bis in Idem in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ cit. 109. In the same vein, see C Burchard and D Brodowski, ‘The Post-Lisbon Principle of Transnational Ne Bis in Idem: On the Relationship between Article 50 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 54 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement’ (2010) NJECL 310 (fn 4). See, very recently, case C-435/22 PPU HF ECLI:EU:C:2022:775, opinion of AG Collins, para. 41.
26 See JAE Vervaele, ‘The Transnational Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the EU Mutual Recognition and Equivalent Protection of Human Rights’ cit. 110 and, by analogy, X Groussot and A Ericsson, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in the EU and ECHR Legal Orders’ cit. 56. In the same line, see Åkerberg Fransson, opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, cit. paras 81–87.
27 PC Roberts, ‘The Causes of Wrongful Conviction’ (2003) The Independent Review 567.
28 AT Grounds, ‘Understanding the Effects of Wrongful Imprisonment’ (2005) Crime and Justice 1.
29 This is the well-known “Blackstone Ratio”, on which, for further reference and analysis, see A Voloch, ‘n Guilty Men’ (1997) UPaLRev 173.
30 R Vanni, ‘La Revisione in Pejus del Giudicato Penale: Frana il Tradizionale Divieto?’ (1993) La Legislazione Penale 605.
31 J Nan and S Lestrade, ‘Towards a European Right to Claim Innocence?’ (2020) European Papers www.europeanpapers.eu 1329.
32 For a critical examination of the admissibility phase in the Italian legal framework, see L Bernardini, ‘Una nozione imprecisa, un iter disorganico: quale futuro per la “manifesta infondatezza” del ricorso di revisione?’ (2023) Diritto Penale e Processo 575.
33 TD Lyon, SN Stolzenberg and K McWilliams, ‘Wrongful Acquittals of Sexual Abuse’ (2017) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 805, 806.
34 That is, in favor of the convicted individual.
35 Namely, at the detriment of the acquitted person.
36 F Carrara, Opuscoli di Diritto Criminale (Tipografia Giusti 1886) 296.
37 This assumption relies on the scientific literature on the phenomenon of wrongful convictions. See inter alia M Naughton, ‘Criminologizing Wrongful Convictions’ (2014) The British Journal of Criminology 1148, and, more recently, G Johnson and DW Engstrom, ‘Judge Learned Hand’s Haunting: The Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction’ (2020) Social Justice 195. For a medical perspective, see also SK Brooks and N Greenberg, ‘Psychological Impact of Being Wrongfully Accused of Criminal Offences: A Systematic Literature Review’ (2021) Medicine, Science and the Law 44.
38 As emphasized, very recently, in case C-147/22 Központi Nyomozó Főügyészség ECLI:EU:C:2023:549, opinion of AG Emiliou, para. 57.
39 According to S Coutts, Citizenship, Crime and Community in the European Union cit. 156, the possibility to reopen a case “would give [the State] multiple changes to amend and improve its case, an opportunity that is unavailable to the accused”, thus hindering the “equality of arms” principle.
40 In this regard, see S Montaldo, ‘Offenders’ Rehabilitation: Towards a New Paradigm for EU Criminal Law?’ (2018) European Criminal Law Review 223 and L Foresberg and T Douglas, ‘What Is Criminal Rehabilitation?’ (2022) Criminal Law and Philosophy 103. On time and punishment intertwined issues, see, among others, JV Roberts, ‘The Time of Punishment: Proportionality and the Sentencing of Historical Crimes’ in M Tonry (ed.), Of One-eyed and Toothless Miscreants: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime? (Oxford University Press 2019) 149.
41 This is evidenced by the different approaches taken by European countries. For instance, the Italian legal framework distinctly bars the prospect of reopening cases with the intent of convicting an individual who has been definitively acquitted (see art. 630 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure). Conversely, in the German legal system, provisions exist that permit the reconsideration of cases under exceptional circumstances, potentially leading to adverse outcomes for those previously acquitted (see para. 362(5) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure).
42 In this regard, see M Tonry, ‘Wrongful Acquittals and “Unduly Lenient” Sentences—Misconceived Problems that Provoke Unjust Solutions’ in L Zedner and J V Roberts (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford University Press 2012) 307. For a US perspective, see PG Cassell, ‘Tradeoffs Between Wrongful Convictions and Wrongful Acquittals: Understanding and Avoiding the Risks’ (2018) Seton Hall Law Review 1435.
43 N Garoupa and M Rizzoli, ‘Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence’ (2012) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 224, 230.
44 PG Cassell, ‘Tradeoffs Between Wrongful Convictions and Wrongful Acquittals’ cit.
45 See, referring to the “general interest of society in effectively pursuing offenders”, Központi Nyomozó Főügyészség, opinion of AG Emiliou, cit. paras 60–61.
46 In situations where a wrongful acquittal results from a substantial or procedural error committed by the prosecuting authorities or the presiding judge, a retrial should not be granted. It is the responsibility of the legal system to protect individuals who have been wrongfully acquitted from bearing the consequences of errors attributable to the state. In any event, this reopening should not serve as a pretext for state authorities to intimidate or harass the acquitted individuals. Conversely, in cases where such a retrial is sought based on specific, and newly arisen circumstances, and the motivation for reopening the case is unrelated to state negligence, there might be grounds for considering such a reopening. Consider an individual who has been acquitted on the grounds of fraudulent or fabricated evidence. In such an instance, the verdict has plainly been compromised by a material and relevant flaw, the revelation of which ought to culminate in the potential reopening of the case. This possibility, which I assume to be arguably the only one which can – and ought to – justify a revision of a final case at the detriment of the acquitted one, should be strictly limited and entertained only if genuinely exceptional circumstances, such as when the newly presented evidence has the potential to significantly affect the case’s outcome, potentially leading to a conviction.
47 Council of Europe, Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 22 November 1984, ETS 117 [1984].
48 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders [2000].
49 See amplius K Ligeti, ‘Fundamental Rights Protection between Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Extending Transnational ne bis in idem Across Administrative and Criminal Procedures’ in K Ligeti and G Robinson (eds), Preventing and Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Eu Criminal Law: A European Law Institute Instrument (Oxford University Press 2018) 160 ff.
50 G Coffey, ‘An Interpretative Analysis of the European Ne Bis in Idem Principle Through the Lens of the ECHR, CFR and CISA Provisions: Are Three Streams Flowing in the Same Channel?’ (2023) NJECL 362 ff. Importantly, the principle of ne bis in idem is also “the result of the rationale of mutual recognition and mutual trust among legal orders” (D Sarmiento, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ cit. 120). More precisely, it “became part of the scheme of mutual trust in the EU [AFSJ]” (JAE Vervaele, ‘Ne Bis in Idem’ cit. 221).
51 B van Bockel, ‘The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the European Union Legal Order’ cit. 329, and M Luchtman, ‘‘The ECJ’s Recent Caselaw on Ne Bis in Idem’ cit. 1724. For a broad analysis of the purpose of art. 54 CISA, see S Coutts, Citizenship, Crime and Community in the European Union cit. 160, and C Burchard and D Brodowski, ‘The Post-Lisbon Principle of Transnational Ne Bis in Idem’ cit.
52 See, among others, art. 55 CISA. In this regard, see A Weyembergh, ‘Le Principe Ne Bis in Idem: Pierre d’Achoppement de l’Espace Pénale Européen?’ (2004) Cahiers de Droit Européen 337, 354 ff.
53 T Lock, ‘Art. 50 CFR’ in M Kellerbauer, M Klamert and J Tomkin (eds), The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2019) 2235. See also J Tomkin, ‘Article 50’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary (CH Beck/Hart/Nomos 2014) 1374–1377 and C Amalfitano and R D’Ambrosio, ‘Articolo 50’ in R Mastroianni, O Pollicino, S Allegrezza and others (eds), Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell’Unione europea (Giuffrè 2017) 1015.
54 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] (“the Explanations”).
55 K Ligeti, ‘Fundamental Rights Protection between Strasbourg and Luxembourg’ cit. 162. This is without prejudice to art. 51(1) of the Charter, which stipulates that, in cases involving proceedings conducted exclusively within a single Member State, art. 50 of the Charter is applicable solely if the situation at hand falls within “the scope of application of Union law”.
56 As per art. 52(1) of the Charter, any prerogative laid down therein may be subject to limitations, yet these exceptions must comply with five conditions: legality, respect for the kernel of the right at stake, necessity, proportionality and that derogation shall “genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”.
57 Case C-524/15 Menci ECLI:EU:C:2018:197 para. 40.
58 Case C-481/19 DB ECLI:EU:C:2020:861, opinion of AG Pikamäe, para. 50.
59 Explanations cit.
60 Menci cit. para. 60.
61 X Groussot and A Ericsson, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in the EU and ECHR Legal Orders’ cit. 60.
62 T Lock, ‘Art. 50 CFR’ cit. 2240.
63 JAE Vervaele, ‘Ne Bis In Idem’ cit. 227.
64 As noted by H Satzger, ‘Application Problems Relating to “Ne Bis in Idem” as Guaranteed Under Art. 50 CFR/Art. 54 CISA and Art. 4 Prot. No. 7 ECHR’ (2020) eucrim 213, the ECHR serves not only as an instrument for interpreting the EU ne bis in idem (as per art. 53 of the Charter) but also establishes a baseline level of protection that cannot be limited under the Charter (as per art. 54 of the Charter).
65 As reported by G Coffey, ‘An Interpretative Analysis of the European Ne Bis in Idem Principle Through the Lens of the ECHR, CFR and CISA Provisions’ cit. 346–347 with additional reference to the relevant case-law. By contrast, Luchtman has rightly pointed out that it cannot be denied that the mere potential for multiple prosecutions concerning the same set of events against the same individuals will unavoidably impact defence strategies and procedural safeguards, such as the right to silence, employed in both proceedings (see M Luchtman, ‘The ECJ’s Recent Caselaw on Ne Bis in Idem’ cit. 1722, for further observations).
66 See S Allegrezza, ‘Art. 4 Prot. n. 7 CEDU’ in S Bartole, P De Sena and V Zagrebelsky (eds), Commentario breve alla Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo (Cedam 2012) 894.
67 ECtHR Gradinger v Austria App n. 15963/90 [23 October 1995] para. 53.
68 ECtHR Matevosyan v Armenia App n. 20409/11 [13 April 2021] para. 47 and the case-law cited therein.
69 ECtHR Prigală v the Republic of Moldova App n. 14426/12 [13 December 2022] para. 8.
70 ECtHR Krombach v France App n. 67521/14 [20 February 2018] para. 40. See K Ligeti, ‘Fundamental Rights Protection between Strasbourg and Luxembourg’ cit. 162.
71 P Oliver and T Bombois, ‘“Ne Bis in Idem” en Droit Européen’ cit. 269 and 272.
72 ECtHR Mihalache v Romania App n. 54012/10 [8 July 2019] para. 47.
73 ECtHR W.A. v Switzerland App n. 38958/16 [2 November 2021] paras 65–66 – they constitute “exceptional circumstances” triggered by “strict conditions”. For further reference in the ECtHR’s case-law, see JI Escobar Veas, Ne bis in idem and Multiple Sanctioning Systems (Springer 2023) 112–114.
74 Case C-398/12 M ECLI:EU:C:2014:65, opinion of AG Sharpston, para. 59.
75 Explanatory Report to the Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1984] para. 31. Significantly, the Explanatory Report does not draw a distinction between “new” facts and “newly discovered” facts, treating “new or newly discovered facts” as a single category of evidence.
76 ECtHR Bulgakova v Russia App n. 69524/01 [18 January 2007] para. 39.
77 Mihalache cit. para. 131.
78 A Ashworth, B Emerson and A Macdonald (eds), Human Rights and Criminal Justice (Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 555.
79 This would preclude the possibility of considering evidence that was available to the parties but was not deliberately presented by them before the judge as “new”. In this case, that evidence did not “arise” after the trial, but already existed during the latter.
80 Although there is no florid case-law in this regard, reference may be made to Kadusic – in that judgement, the Strasbourg Court accepted that the new establishment of the applicant’s mental condition – i.e., the severe mental illness of the applicant that was already present but not detected at the time of the initial judgment – was a “newly discovered fact” (ECtHR Kadusic v Switzerland App n. 43977/13 [9 January 2018] paras 82–86).
81 According to A Ashworth, B Emerson and A Macdonald (eds), Human Rights and Criminal Justice cit. 559, the art. 4(2) definition of evidence of “new or newly discovered facts” does not seem to “include evidence which existed pre-trial but was not adduced”.
82 Mihalache cit. para. 130.
83 Explanatory Report cit. para. 31.
84 JL De la Cuesta, ‘Concurrent national and international criminal jurisdiction and the principle “ne bis in idem”‘(2002) Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal 714
85 G Coffey, ‘Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings: Interpreting Ne Bis in Idem in Conjunction with the Principle of Complementarity’ (2013) NJECL 71.
86 WA Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015) 1155.
87 ECtHR Stăvilă v Romania App n. 23126/16 [1 March 2022] para. 98, emphasis added.
88 See, among others, DJ Harris, M O’Boyle, EP Bates and M Buckley (eds), Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2014) 973, and WA Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights cit. 1154.
89 Mihalache cit. para. 133.
90 The ECtHR specified that “a mere reassessment of the evidence on file by the public prosecutor or the higher-level court would not fulfil that criterion”, see Mihalache cit. para. 133.
91 Explanatory Report cit. para. 31.
92 See, in this vein, B van Bockel, ‘The “European” Ne Bis in Idem Principle: Substance, Sources, and Scope’ in B van Bockel (ed.), Ne Bis in Idem in Eu Law cit. 52 and, similarly, E Ravasi, Human Rights Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ: A Comparative Analysis in Light of the Equivalency Doctrine (Brill 2017) 263.
93 Mihalache cit. para. 133.
94 ECtHR Nikitin v Russia App n. 50178/99 [20 July 2004] paras 22–29 with reference to art. 379 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure read in conjunction with art. 342 thereof. The ECtHR upheld this stance in other judgements, e.g., ECtHR Bratyakin v Russia App n. 72776/01 [9 March 2006], admissibility decision, and ECtHR Fadin v Russia App n. 58079/00 [27 July 2006] paras 30–32.
95 For the sake of completeness, it is noteworthy that the ECtHR has acknowledged the compatibility of reopening final cases owing to a breach of the ECHR with art. 4(2) of Protocol 7 (see ECtHR Hakkar v France App n. 16164/02 [8 October 2002], admissibility decision). This standpoint is reasonable, as a contravention of fundamental rights laid down in the ECHR undoubtedly qualifies as a “fundamental defect”. In a comparable scenario, a late appeal submitted by a prosecutor – based on serious procedural shortcomings – was deemed a valid instance of reopening a final case in accordance with art. 4(2) of Protocol 7, (ECtHR Xheraj v Albania App n. 37959/02 [29 July 2008] paras 69–74). Finally, in Marguš, the First Chamber dealt with the final conviction of the applicant on charges of war crimes, despite the fact that the latter was previously subjected to criminal proceedings for the same facts that terminated with an amnesty. The Court observed that the use of amnesties concerning international crimes is increasingly regarded as proscribed by international law, citing the growing trend for international, regional, and national courts to nullify general amnesty measures enacted by governments. Against this background, the ECtHR deemed the application of the amnesty to be a “fundamental defect in the [previous] proceedings” thus allowing the reopening of a final case as per art. 4(2) of Protocol 7 (ECtHR Marguš v Croatia App n. 4455/10 [13 November 2012] paras 64–76). Regrettably, the case was eventually referred to the Grand Chamber which considered art. 4 of Protocol 7 not applicable in the material circumstances (ECtHR Marguš v Croatia App n. 4455/10 [24 May 2014] paras 139–141). Nonetheless, the perspective advocated by the First Chamber retains a certain degree of significance. Indeed, all the aforementioned examples would demonstrate that, in certain cases, the ECtHR appeared to exhibit a greater inclination toward confining the option to reopen cases exclusively to extraordinary circumstances, thereby amplifying the significance of the ne bis in idem principle within the ECHR legal framework.
96 M O’Boyle, EP Bates and M Buckley (eds), Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2014) 973.
97 E Ravasi, Human Rights Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ cit. 263.
98 A Ashworth, B Emerson and A Macdonald (eds), Human Rights and Criminal Justice cit. 555.
99 The expression originates from ECtHR Velichko v Russia App n. 19664/07 [15 January 2013] para. 69 with further reference.
100 Mihalache cit. dissenting opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque paras 42–43.
101 See, among others, D Spielmann, ‘Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and The National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?’ (2012) CYELS 381.
102 I have previously advocated for the necessity of such an “autonomist” approach in relation to the ECHR, aiming to ensure broader protection of procedural safeguards through clear and straightforward rules. See, in this regard, L Bernardini, ‘Turning Labels: A Sound Interpretation of the Right to Be Informed in Criminal Proceedings that Still Holds some Drawbacks: BK (Case C-175/22)’ (29 November 2023) EU Law Live eulawlive.com. For an analysis of a recent instance of the CJEU’s “emancipation” from the ECtHR’s case-law in the field of criminal fair trial rights, see L Bernardini, ‘On Encrypted Messages and Clear Verdicts – the EncroChat Case Before the Court of Justice (Case C-670/22, MN)’ (21 May 2024) EU Law Live eulawlive.com.
103 This was the case, for instance, of case C-348/21 HYA and Others ECLI:EU:C:2022:965 concerning the right to participation in criminal trials. For a commentary in this vein, see L Bernardini and G Ancona, ‘HYA and Others: Reshaping participation at criminal trials in Europe’ (2023) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 312, 319–324 and S Allegrezza, ‘Absent Prosecution Witnesses and Active Participation at Trial: The European Court of Justice Shapes European Fairness on Criminal Justice’ 300 ff., forthcoming (to be included in the Liber Amicorum Judge Bay Larsen). For a slightly differing perspective, see A Cabiale, ‘Absent Witnesses and EU Law: A Groundbreaking Ruling by the CJEU in Criminal Matters’ (2023) European Papers www.europeanpapers.eu 66.
104 Anne Louise Germaine de Staël-Holstein (Madame de Staël), Considérations sur les principaux événemens de la Révolution française, ouvrage posthume de madame la baronne de Staël, publié par M. le duc de Broglie et M. le baron de Staël (Delaunay, Bossange et Masson 1818, 2nd volume) 335.
