Accountability; Banking union; European central bank; Independence; Unconventional monetary policy; Law; Political Science and International Relations
Résumé :
[en] This introductory article sets the ground for the analysis performed in the articles included in this Special Issue. It shows why a new analysis of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s accountability is required by referring to recent developments, and by underlining how much the ECB’s role and standing have changed since its creation 20 years ago. Indeed, its resorting to unconventional monetary policies in response to the recent economic and financial crisis, as well as the creation of the Banking Union, have significantly affected the ECB. This introduction also recalls the main elements of the debate on the balance between accountability and independence, and shows how this balance has evolved. On the basis of the findings of the articles included in this Special Issue, some conclusions and hypotheses as to the way forward are formulated.
1. This Special Issue is the result of an initiative funded by the Law Faculty of Maastricht University, the Universiteitsfonds Limburg (SWOL) and the Centre for European Research in Maastricht (CERiM – a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union).
