[en] While such epistemic rules as ‘If you perceive that X, you ought to believe that X ’ and ‘If you have outstanding testimony that X, you ought to believe that X ’ seem to be getting at important truths, it is easy to think of cases in which they come into conflict. To avoid classifying such cases as dilemmas, one can hold either that epistemic rules have built-in unless-clauses listing the circumstances under which they don't apply or, alternatively, that epistemic rules are contributory. This paper explores both responses from a formal perspective, drawing on a simple defeasible logic framework.
Disciplines :
Philosophie & éthique
Auteur, co-auteur :
KNOKS, Aleks ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Humanities (DHUM) > Philosophy
Co-auteurs externes :
no
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Epistemic Conflicts and the Form of Epistemic Rules
This work was supported by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) through the project DELIGHT (OPEN O20/14776480). I owe a special debt of gratitude to Fabrizio Cariani, John Horty, Thomas Icard, and Benjamin Kiesewetter – all of whom supported this project in different ways – as well as an anonymous referee of this journal whose insightful comments have led to several important improvements.
Boghossian, P. (2008). ‘Epistemic Rules,’ Journal of Philosophy 105(9), pp. 472–500.
Bradley, D. (2019). ‘Are there Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?’ Philosopher's Imprint 19(3), pp. 1–19.
Chisholm, R. (1980). ‘A Version of Foundationalism,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5(1), pp. 543–564.
Christensen, D. (2007). ‘Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals,’ in T. Szabó Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds) Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 2. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–31.
Christensen, D. (2010). ‘Higher-Order Evidence,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81(1), pp. 185–215.
Christensen, D. (2013). ‘Epistemic Modesty Defended,’ in D. Christensen and J. Lackey (eds) The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–97.
Conee, E. and Feldman, R. (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics Without Principles. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dancy, J. (2017). ‘Moral Particularism,’ in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Winter 2017 edition.
Elga, A. (2007). ‘Reflection and Disagreement,’ Noûs 41(3), pp. 478–502.
Elga, A. (2010). ‘How to Disagree About How to Disagree,’ in R. Feldman and T. Warfield (eds) Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 175–186.
Engel, P. (2013). ‘In Defense of Normativism About the Aim of Belief,’ in T. Chan (ed.) The Aim of Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 32–63.
Fogal, D. (2016). ‘Bad Attitutdes: Rationality and Its Discontents,’ PhD thesis, New York University.
Goldman, A. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Goldman, A. (2009). ‘Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification,’ The Journal of Philosophy 106(6), pp. 309–338.
Holton, R. (2002). ‘Principles and Particularisms,’ In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Volume 76 (pp. 191–210).
Horty, J. (2012). Reasons as Defaults. New York: Oxford University Press.
Huemer, M. (2000). ‘Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88(2), pp. 397–413.
Knoks, A. (2021). ‘Moral Principles: Hedged, Contributory, Mixed,’ in F. Liu, A. Marra, P. Portner and F. V. D. Putte (eds) Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 15th International Conference (DEON 2020/2021). London: College Publications, pp. 272–290.
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2010). ‘Unreasonable Knowledge,’ Philosophical Perspectives 24, pp. 1–21.
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2014). ‘Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88(2), pp. 314–345.
Makinson, D. (2005). Bridges from Classical to Nonmonotonic Logic. King's College Publications.
Peacocke, C. (2004). The Realm of Reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pollock, J. (1974). Knowledge and Justification. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pollock, J. (1995). Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for How to Build a Person. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pollock, J. and Cruz, J. (1999). Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd edn. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Pryor, J. (2000). ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,’ Noûs 34(4), pp. 517–549.
Pryor, J. (2018). ‘The Merits of Incoherence,’ Analytic Philosophy 59(1), pp. 112–141.
Reiter, R. (1980). ‘A Logic for Default Reasoning,’ Artificial Intelligece 13, pp. 81–132.
Ross, W. D. (1930). The Right and the Good. New York: Oxford University Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (2000). ‘Principles and Particularisms,’ In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Volume 74 (pp. 301–317).
Titelbaum, M. (2015). ‘Rationality's Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason),’ in T. Szabó Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds) Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 5. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 253–294.
Wedgwood, R. (2002). ‘Internalism Explained,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2), pp. 349–369.
