eLIMInate: a Leakage-focused ISE for Masked Implementation

CHENG, Hao; Page, Daniel; Wang, Weijia

doi:10.46586/tches.v2024.i2.329-358

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eLIMInate: a Leakage-focused ISE for Masked Implementation

CHENG, Hao; Page, Daniel; Wang, Weijia

2024 • In IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2024 (2), p. 329 - 358

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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/61324

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10.46586/tches.v2024.i2.329-358

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Disciplines :

Computer science

Author, co-author :

CHENG, Hao ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA

Page, Daniel; School of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

Wang, Weijia; School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China

External co-authors :

yes

Language :

English

Title :

eLIMInate: a Leakage-focused ISE for Masked Implementation

Publication date :

March 2024

Event name :

Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2024)

Event place :

Halifax, Canada

Event date :

from 04-09-2024 to 07-09-2024

Audience :

International

Journal title :

IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems

eISSN :

2569-2925

Publisher :

Ruhr-University of Bochum

Volume :

2024

Issue :

Pages :

329 - 358

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Additional URL :

https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11431

Available on ORBilu :

since 08 June 2024

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Bibliography

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