Banking Union; transparency; accountability; European Central bank; central bank
Abstract :
[en] After over a decade of crisis, the ECB’s functions have expanded considerably, which in turn altered its relationship with other institutions. In particular, when the ECB assumed the role of Banking Supervisor under the Single Supervisory Mechanisms, it was generally accepted that this role would require more accountability than its traditional role in monetary policy. Yet, accountability requires transparency. However, there is a dearth of studies on the transparency of European banking supervision, and the few that exist are usually single case studies. This leaves us without a point of comparison that would help us understand what constitutes a “transparent banking supervisor”. Therefore, the aim of this article is to situate the transparency of the ECB within the wider literature on the transparency of banking supervisors. This allows us to pinpoint more precisely its strengths and shortcomings and the potential for reforms.
Disciplines :
Political science, public administration & international relations
Author, co-author :
Högenauer, Anna-Lena ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC)
External co-authors :
no
Language :
English
Title :
The ECB as a banking supervisor: transparent compared to what?
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