Article (Périodiques scientifiques)
Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability
PIERRET, Laura; HOWARTH, David
2023In Journal of European Integration, 45 (1), p. 15-41
Peer reviewed vérifié par ORBi
 

Documents


Texte intégral
Pierret and Howarth Moral Hazard central bankers and Banking Union professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability.pdf
Postprint Éditeur (1.7 MB)
Télécharger

Tous les documents dans ORBilu sont protégés par une licence d'utilisation.

Envoyer vers



Détails



Mots-clés :
Moral hazard; financial stability; Banking Union; Bundesbank; European Central Bank
Résumé :
[en] Banking Union was a major policy response to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Moral hazard has frequently been presented as a major cause of these crises. Therefore, Banking Union can be understood as a response to moral hazard in relation to banks and sovereigns. Yet, moral hazard was an acknowledged and supposedly managed problem prior to these events. Paradoxically, moral hazard has been used to justify contradictory policy options to safeguard European financial system stability, such as decentralized institutional arrangements for banking supervision but also a centralized system coordinated by the European Central Bank (ECB). To address this paradox, this paper investigates moral hazard as a political concept. Based on a comparison of how central bankers from the Bundesbank and the ECB understand and use the moral hazard concept, this paper argues that moral hazard is closer to the realm of politics than expertise.
Disciplines :
Sciences politiques, administration publique & relations internationales
Auteur, co-auteur :
PIERRET, Laura  ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC)
HOWARTH, David  ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC)
Co-auteurs externes :
no
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability
Date de publication/diffusion :
mars 2023
Titre du périodique :
Journal of European Integration
ISSN :
0703-6337
eISSN :
1477-2280
Maison d'édition :
Routledge, Royaume-Uni
Titre particulier du numéro :
Banking on Europe: Reinforcing the Unstable Pillars of European Banking Union at Ten
Volume/Tome :
45
Fascicule/Saison :
1
Pagination :
15-41
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed vérifié par ORBi
Focus Area :
Finance
Projet FnR :
FNR13712846 - Building Effective European Banking Supervision, 2019 (01/09/2020-31/08/2023) - David Howarth
Disponible sur ORBilu :
depuis le 17 mars 2023

Statistiques


Nombre de vues
158 (dont 5 Unilu)
Nombre de téléchargements
139 (dont 3 Unilu)

citations Scopus®
 
7
citations Scopus®
sans auto-citations
5
citations OpenAlex
 
8
citations WoS
 
7

Bibliographie


Publications similaires



Contacter ORBilu