| Reference : Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: professional dissensus and the poli... |
| Scientific journals : Article | |||
| Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations | |||
| Finance | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/54590 | |||
| Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability | |
| English | |
Pierret, Laura  [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) >] | |
| Howarth, David [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) >] | |
| Mar-2023 | |
| Journal of European Integration | |
| Routledge | |
| 45 | |
| 1 | |
| Banking on Europe: Reinforcing the Unstable Pillars of European Banking Union at Ten | |
| 15-41 | |
| Yes | |
| International | |
| 0703-6337 | |
| 1477-2280 | |
| United Kingdom | |
| [en] Moral hazard ; financial stability ; Banking Union ; Bundesbank ; European Central Bank | |
| [en] Banking Union was a major policy response to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Moral hazard has frequently been presented as a major cause of these
crises. Therefore, Banking Union can be understood as a response to moral hazard in relation to banks and sovereigns. Yet, moral hazard was an acknowledged and supposedly managed problem prior to these events. Paradoxically, moral hazard has been used to justify contradictory policy options to safeguard European financial system stability, such as decentralized institutional arrangements for banking supervision but also a centralized system coordinated by the European Central Bank (ECB). To address this paradox, this paper investigates moral hazard as a political concept. Based on a comparison of how central bankers from the Bundesbank and the ECB understand and use the moral hazard concept, this paper argues that moral hazard is closer to the realm of politics than expertise. | |
| Researchers ; Professionals ; Students | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/54590 | |
| 10.1080/07036337.2022.2156501 | |
| https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2022.2156501 | |
| FnR ; FNR13712846 > David Howarth > BEEBS > Building Effective European Banking Supervision > 01/09/2020 > 31/08/2023 > 2019 |
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