Reference : Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: professional dissensus and the poli...
Scientific journals : Article
Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations
Finance
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/54590
Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability
English
Pierret, Laura mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) >]
Howarth, David mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) >]
Mar-2023
Journal of European Integration
Routledge
45
1
Banking on Europe: Reinforcing the Unstable Pillars of European Banking Union at Ten
15-41
Yes
International
0703-6337
1477-2280
United Kingdom
[en] Moral hazard ; financial stability ; Banking Union ; Bundesbank ; European Central Bank
[en] Banking Union was a major policy response to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Moral hazard has frequently been presented as a major cause of these
crises. Therefore, Banking Union can be understood as a response to moral hazard in relation to banks and sovereigns. Yet, moral hazard was an acknowledged and supposedly managed problem prior to these events. Paradoxically, moral hazard has been used to justify contradictory policy options to safeguard European financial system stability, such as decentralized institutional arrangements for banking supervision but also a centralized system coordinated by the European Central Bank (ECB). To address this paradox, this paper investigates moral hazard as a political concept. Based on a
comparison of how central bankers from the Bundesbank and the ECB understand and use the moral hazard concept, this paper argues that moral hazard is closer to the realm of politics than
expertise.
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/54590
10.1080/07036337.2022.2156501
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2022.2156501
FnR ; FNR13712846 > David Howarth > BEEBS > Building Effective European Banking Supervision > 01/09/2020 > 31/08/2023 > 2019

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