Reference : Deciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation and Obstruction
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
Deciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation and Obstruction
Anesi, Vincent mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Department of Economics and Management (DEM) >]
Safronov, Mikhail []
In press
International Economic Review
United States - New Jersey
[en] Deliberation ; obstruction ; Pareto inefficiency ; stability ; voting ; pivots
[en] We study the impact of deliberation rules on collective learning and decision making in committees. In contrast to much of the existing literature, this paper makes a distinction between the final votes over policy proposals and the cloture votes that bring them about. We show how deliberation rules can cause Pareto inefficient outcomes and failures to bring good proposals to a final vote, and how they affect the distribution of power among committee members in the deliberative process. We further show that deliberation rules are dynamically stable, even when they generate Pareto ineffcient outcomes.
Researchers ; Students

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