Reference : How Efficient are Replay Attacks against Vote Privacy? A Formal Quantitative Analysis

	Document type :	Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
	Discipline(s) :	Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
	Focus Areas :	Security, Reliability and Trust
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/51209

Title :	How Efficient are Replay Attacks against Vote Privacy? A Formal Quantitative Analysis
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Mestel, David [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA >]
	Mueller, Johannes [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA >]
	Reisert, Pascal [University of Stuttgart]
Publication date :	2022
Main document title :	35th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Peer reviewed :	Yes
Event name :	IEEE CSF 2022
Event date :	from 07-08-2022 to 10-10-2022
Abstract :	[en] Replay attacks are among the most well-known attacks against vote privacy. Many e-voting systems have been proven vulnerable to replay attacks, including systems like Helios that are used in real practical elections. Despite their popularity, it is commonly believed that replay attacks are inefficient but the actual threat that they pose to vote privacy has never been studied formally. Therefore, in this paper, we precisely analyze for the first time how efficient replay attacks really are. We study this question from commonly used and complementary perspectives on vote privacy, showing as an independent contribution that a simple extension of a popular game-based privacy definition corresponds to a strong entropy-based notion. Our results demonstrate that replay attacks can be devastating for a voter's privacy even when an adversary's resources are very limited. We illustrate our formal findings by applying them to a number of real-world elections, showing that a modest number of replays can result in significant privacy loss. Overall, our work reveals that, contrary to a common belief, replay attacks can be very efficient and must therefore be considered a serious threat.
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/51209
FnR project :	FnR ; FNR14698166 > Johannes Mueller > FP2 > Future-proofing Privacy In Secure Electronic Voting > 01/01/2021 > 31/12/2023 > 2020

	File(s) associated to this reference
	Fulltext file(s): File Commentary Version Size Access Open access main.pdf Publisher postprint 412.22 kB View/Open Additional material(s): File Commentary Size Access Open access priv_calc_ktv.cpp 2.56 kB View/Open Open access strong_priv.cpp 3.03 kB View/Open

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