[en] Replay attacks are among the most well-known attacks against vote privacy. Many e-voting systems have been proven vulnerable to replay attacks, including systems like Helios that are used in real practical elections.
Despite their popularity, it is commonly believed that replay attacks are inefficient but the actual threat that they pose to vote privacy has never been studied formally. Therefore, in this paper, we precisely analyze for the first time how efficient replay attacks really are.
We study this question from commonly used and complementary perspectives on vote privacy, showing as an independent contribution that a simple extension of a popular game-based privacy definition corresponds to a strong entropy-based notion.
Our results demonstrate that replay attacks can be devastating for a voter's privacy even when an adversary's resources are very limited. We illustrate our formal findings by applying them to a number of real-world elections, showing that a modest number of replays can result in significant privacy loss. Overall, our work reveals that, contrary to a common belief, replay attacks can be very efficient and must therefore be considered a serious threat.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Auteur, co-auteur :
MESTEL, David ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA
MUELLER, Johannes ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA
Reisert, Pascal; University of Stuttgart
Co-auteurs externes :
yes
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
How Efficient are Replay Attacks against Vote Privacy? A Formal Quantitative Analysis
Date de publication/diffusion :
2022
Nom de la manifestation :
IEEE CSF 2022
Date de la manifestation :
from 07-08-2022 to 10-10-2022
Titre de l'ouvrage principal :
35th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Focus Area :
Security, Reliability and Trust
Projet FnR :
FNR14698166 - Future-proofing Privacy In Secure Electronic Voting, 2020 (01/01/2021-31/12/2023) - Johannes Mueller
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