[en] According to conciliatory views on the significance of disagreement, it’s rational for you to become less confident in your take on an issue in case your epistemic peer’s take on it is different. These views are intuitively appealing, but they also face a powerful objection: in scenarios that involve disagreements over their own correctness, conciliatory views appear to self-defeat and, thereby, issue inconsistent recommendations. This paper provides a response to this objection. Drawing on the work from defeasible logics paradigm and abstract argumentation, it develops a formal model of conciliatory reasoning and explores its behavior in the troubling scenarios. The model suggests that the recommendations that conciliatory views issue in such scenarios are perfectly reasonable---even if outwardly they may look odd.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Auteur, co-auteur :
KNOKS, Aleks ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS)
Co-auteurs externes :
no
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Conciliatory reasoning, self-defeat, and abstract argumentation
Date de publication/diffusion :
25 août 2023
Titre du périodique :
Review of Symbolic Logic
ISSN :
1755-0203
eISSN :
1755-0211
Maison d'édition :
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Royaume-Uni
Barberà, S., Bossert, W., & Pattaniak, P. (2004). Ranking sets of objects. In Barberà, S., Hammond, P., & Seidl, C., editors. Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 2. Boston: Springer Science+Business Media, pp. 893–977.
Barringer, H., Gabbay, D., & Woods, J. (2012). Temporal, numerical and meta-level dynamics in argumentation networks. Argument and Computation, 3(2–3), 143–202.
Bogardus, T. (2009). A vindication of the equal-weight view. Episteme, 6(3), 324–335.
Brass, S. (1991). Deduction with supernormal defaults. In Brewka, G., Jantke, K., & Schmitt, P., editors. Nonmonotonic and Inductive Logics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 659. Boston: Springer, pp. 153–174.
Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. Philosophical Review, 116, 187–217.
Christensen, D. (2010). Higher-order evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1), 185–215.
Christensen, D. (2011). Disagreement, question-begging and epistemic self-criticism. Philosophers’ Imprint, 11(6), 1–22.
Christensen, D. (2013). Epistemic modesty defended. In Christensen, D., & Lackey, J., editors. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–97.
Christensen, D. (2016). Conciliation, uniqueness and rational toxicity. Noûs, 50(3), 584–603.
Christensen, D. (2021). Akratic (epistemic) modesty. Philosophical Studies, 178, 2191–2214.
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Decker, J. (2014). Conciliation and self-incrimination. Erkenntnis, 79, 1099–1134.
Dung, P. M. (1995). On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. Artificial Intelligence, 77(2), 321–357.
Dunne, P., Hunter, A., McBurney, P., Parsons, S., & Wooldridge, M. (2011). Weighted argument systems: Basic definitions, algorithms, and complexity results. Artificial Intelligence, 175(2), 457–486.
Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. Noûs, 41(3), 478–502.
Elga, A. (2010). How to disagree about how to disagree. In Feldman, R., & Warfield, T., editors. Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 175–186.
Feldman, R. (2005). Respecting the evidence. Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1), 95–119.
Feldman, R. (2006). Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In Hetherington, S., editor. Epistemology Futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 216–236.
Feldman, R. (2009). Evidentialism, higher-order evidence, and disagreement. Episteme, 6, 294–312.
Fleisher, W. (2021). How to endorse conciliationism. Synthese, 198, 9913–9939.
Gabbay, D. (2012). An equational approach to argumentation networks. Argument and Computation, 3(2–3), 87–142.
Gelfert, A. (2011). Who is an epistemic peer? Logos and Episteme, 2(4), 507–514.
Grossi, D., & Modgil, S. (2015). On the graded acceptability of arguments. In Proceedings of the 24th Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI. AI Press, pp. 868–874.
Horty, J. F. (2012). Reasons as Defaults. Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. (2005). The epistemic significance of disagreement. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1, 179–192.
Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher-order evidence. In Feldman, R., & Warfield, T., editors. Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 111–174.
King, N. (2012). Disagreement: What’s the problem? Or a good peer is hard to find. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(2), 249–272.
Lackey, J. (2010a). A justificationists view of disagreement’s epistemic significance. In Haddock, A., Millar, A., & Pritchard, D., editors. Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 298–325.
Lackey, J. (2010b). What should we do when we disagree? Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 3, 274–293.
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2013). Disagreement and evidential attenuation. Noûs, 47, 767–794.
Littlejohn, C. (2013). Disagreement and defeat. In Machuca, D., editor. Disagreement and Skepticism. New York: Routledge, pp. 169–192.
Littlejohn, C. (2020). Should we be dogmatically conciliatory? Philosophical Studies, 177, 1381–1398.
Matheson, J. (2015a). Are conciliatory views of disagreement self-defeating? Social Epistemology, 29(2), 145–159.
Matheson, J. (2015b). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. New York: Pelgrave Macmillan.
Matheson, J. (2018). Disagreement and epistemic peers. In Oxford Handbooks Online. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/97801999353.
Modgil, S., & Prakken, H. (2013). A general account of argumentation with preferences. Artificial Intelligence, 195, 361–397.
Pittard, J. (2015). Resolute conciliationism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260), 442–463.
Pollock, J. (1994). Justification and defeat. Artificial Intelligence, 67, 377–407.
Pollock, J. (1995). Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for How to Build a Person. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pollock, J. (2001). Defeasible reasoning with variable degrees of justification. Artificial Intelligence, 133, 233–282.
Pollock, J. (2009). A recursive semantics for defeasible reasoning. In Simari, G., & Rahwan, I., editors. Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence. New York: Springer, pp. 173–197.
Pollock, J. (2010). Defeasible reasoning and degrees of justification. Argument and Computation, 1(1), 7–22.
Prakken, H., & Sartor, G. (1997). Argument-based extended logic programming with defeasible priorities. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic, 1(2), 25–75.
Prakken, H., & Vreeswijk, G. (2001). Logics for defeasible argumentation. In Gabbay, D. M., & Guenthner, F., editors. Handbooks of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 219–318.
Reiter, R. (1980). A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13, 81–132.
Titelbaum, M. (2015). Rationality’s fixed point (or: In defense of right reason). Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5, 253–294.
Weatherson, B. (2013). Disagreements, philosophical, and otherwise. In Christensen, D., & Lackey, J., editors. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press, pp. 54–73.
Wedgwood, R. (2010). The moral evil demons. In Feldman, R., & Warfield, T., editors. Disagreement. Oxford University Press, pp. 216–246.
