How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment

Reference : How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment


	Document type :	Scientific journals : Article
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : General economics & history of economic thought
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/49282

Title :	How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Fatas, Enrique [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF)]
	Tamborero, Pilar [LSF Finance Research]
	Neugebauer, Tibor [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF)]
Publication date :	2007
Journal title :	Journal of Economics
Publisher :	Springer Science
Volume :	32
Issue/season :	2
Pages :	167-196
Peer reviewed :	Yes (verified by ORBi^lu)
Audience :	International
ISSN :	0931-8658
e-ISSN :	1617-7134
City :	Wien
Country :	Germany
Keywords :	[en] Subject-pool effect ; experts ; expected utility ; prospect theory
Abstract :	[en] We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These political experts face political choice problems under risk and probability. Thus, we test the frequently observed violations of rational choice theory -the reference point effect, loss aversion, framing effects, and the common ratio effect- with experts from the field. Their choices violate expected utility theory. Nevertheless, they appear to be more rational and less risk averse (loving) in the domain of gains (losses) than student subjects.
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/49282
DOI :	10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4
Other URL :	http://public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es/pdfs/E200458.pdf

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