Reference : How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : General economics & history of economic thought
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/49282
How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment
English
Fatas, Enrique [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF)]
Tamborero, Pilar [LSF Finance Research]
Neugebauer, Tibor mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF)]
2007
Journal of Economics
Springer Science
32
2
167-196
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
0931-8658
1617-7134
Wien
Germany
[en] Subject-pool effect ; experts ; expected utility ; prospect theory
[en] We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These political experts face political choice problems under risk and probability. Thus, we test the frequently observed violations of rational choice theory -the reference point effect, loss aversion, framing effects, and the common ratio effect- with experts from the field. Their choices violate expected utility theory. Nevertheless, they appear to be more rational and less risk averse (loving) in the domain of gains (losses) than student subjects.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/49282
10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4
http://public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es/pdfs/E200458.pdf

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