Reference : How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment |
Scientific journals : Article | |||
Business & economic sciences : General economics & history of economic thought | |||
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/49282 | |||
How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment | |
English | |
Fatas, Enrique [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF)] | |
Tamborero, Pilar [LSF Finance Research] | |
Neugebauer, Tibor ![]() | |
2007 | |
Journal of Economics | |
Springer Science | |
32 | |
2 | |
167-196 | |
Yes (verified by ORBilu) | |
International | |
0931-8658 | |
1617-7134 | |
Wien | |
Germany | |
[en] Subject-pool effect ; experts ; expected utility ; prospect theory | |
[en] We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These political experts face political choice problems under risk and probability. Thus, we test the frequently observed violations of rational choice theory -the reference point effect, loss aversion, framing effects, and the common ratio effect- with experts from the field. Their choices violate expected utility theory. Nevertheless, they appear to be more rational and less risk averse (loving) in the domain of gains (losses) than student subjects. | |
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/49282 | |
10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4 | |
http://public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es/pdfs/E200458.pdf |
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