Reference : Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Conflicting Ideals, and Defeasible Logic
Scientific journals : Article
Arts & humanities : Philosophy & ethics
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48986
Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Conflicting Ideals, and Defeasible Logic
English
Knoks, Aleks mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Medicine (FSTM) > Department of Computer Science (DCS) >]
13-Dec-2021
Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Michigan Publishing
8
6
141-174
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
2330-4014
MI
[en] Epistemic normativity ; Higher-order evidence ; Rationality ideals ; Defeasible logic ; Epistemic dilemmas
[en] Thinking about misleading higher-order evidence naturally leads to a puzzle about epistemic rationality: If one's total evidence can be radically misleading regarding itself, then two widely-accepted requirements of rationality come into conflict, suggesting that there are rational dilemmas. This paper focuses on an often misunderstood and underexplored response to this (and similar) puzzles, the so-called conflicting-ideals view. Drawing on work from defeasible logic, I propose understanding this view as a move away from the default meta-epistemological position according to which rationality requirements are strict and governed by a strong, but never explicitly stated logic, toward the more unconventional view, according to which requirements are defeasible and governed by a comparatively weak logic. When understood this way, the response is not committed to dilemmas.
Researchers
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48986
10.3998/ERGO.1143
https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1143/

File(s) associated to this reference

Fulltext file(s):

FileCommentaryVersionSizeAccess
Open access
_ergo-1143-knoks.pdfPublisher postprint1.97 MBView/Open

Bookmark and Share SFX Query

All documents in ORBilu are protected by a user license.