Reference : DeFi, Not So Decentralized: The Measured Distribution of Voting Rights

	Document type :	Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
	Discipline(s) :	Law, criminology & political science : Multidisciplinary, general & others Social & behavioral sciences, psychology : Library & information sciences Engineering, computing & technology : Multidisciplinary, general & others
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48726

Title :	DeFi, Not So Decentralized: The Measured Distribution of Voting Rights
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Barbereau, Tom Josua [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
	Smethurst, Reilly [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
	Papageorgiou, Orestis [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
	Rieger, Alexander [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
	Fridgen, Gilbert [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
Publication date :	Jan-2022
Main document title :	Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 2022
Pages :	10
Peer reviewed :	Yes
Audience :	International
ISBN :	978-0-9981331-5-7
Event name :	55th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Event date :	from 03-01-22 to 07-01-22
Event organizer :	University of Hawaii
Event place (city) :	Maui, Hawaii
Event country :	USA
Keywords :	[en] decentralized finance ; cryptocurrency ; blockchain governance ; decentralized autonomous organization ; financial regulation
Abstract :	[en] Bitcoin and Ethereum are frequently promoted as decentralized, but developers and academics question their actual decentralization. This motivates further experiments with public permissionless blockchains to achieve decentralization along technical, economic, and political lines. The distribution of tokenized voting rights aims for political decentralization. Tokenized voting rights achieved notoriety within the nascent field of decentralized finance (DeFi) in 2020. As an alternative to centralized crypto-asset exchanges and lending platforms (owned by companies like Coinbase and Celsius), DeFi developers typically create non-custodial projects that are not majority-owned or managed by legal entities. Holders of tokenized voting rights can instead govern DeFi projects. To scrutinize DeFi’s distributed governance strategies, we conducted a multiple-case study of non-custodial, Ethereum-based DeFi projects: Uniswap, Maker, SushiSwap, Yearn Finance, and UMA. Our findings are novel and surprising: quantitative evaluations of DeFi’s distributed governance strategies reveal a failure to achieve political decentralization.
Research centres :	Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT) > Other
Funders :	Fonds National de la Recherche - FnR
Target :	Researchers ; Professionals ; General public
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48726
Other URL :	http://hdl.handle.net/10125/80074
FnR project :	FnR ; FNR13342933 > Gilbert Fridgen > DFS > Paypal-fnr Pearl Chair In Digital Financial Services > 01/01/2020 > 31/12/2024 > 2019

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