Reference : DeFi, Not So Decentralized: The Measured Distribution of Voting Rights
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
Law, criminology & political science : Multidisciplinary, general & others
Social & behavioral sciences, psychology : Library & information sciences
Engineering, computing & technology : Multidisciplinary, general & others
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48726
DeFi, Not So Decentralized: The Measured Distribution of Voting Rights
English
Barbereau, Tom Josua mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
Smethurst, Reilly mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
Papageorgiou, Orestis mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
Rieger, Alexander mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
Fridgen, Gilbert mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > FINATRAX >]
Jan-2022
Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 2022
10
Yes
International
978-0-9981331-5-7
55th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
from 03-01-22 to 07-01-22
University of Hawaii
Maui, Hawaii
USA
[en] decentralized finance ; cryptocurrency ; blockchain governance ; decentralized autonomous organization ; financial regulation
[en] Bitcoin and Ethereum are frequently promoted as decentralized, but developers and academics question their actual decentralization. This motivates further experiments with public permissionless blockchains to achieve decentralization along technical, economic, and political lines. The distribution of tokenized voting rights aims for political decentralization. Tokenized voting rights achieved notoriety within the nascent field of decentralized finance (DeFi) in 2020. As an alternative to centralized crypto-asset exchanges and lending platforms (owned by companies like Coinbase and Celsius), DeFi developers typically create non-custodial projects that are not majority-owned or managed by legal entities. Holders of tokenized voting rights can instead govern DeFi projects. To scrutinize DeFi’s distributed governance strategies, we conducted a multiple-case study of non-custodial, Ethereum-based DeFi projects: Uniswap, Maker, SushiSwap, Yearn Finance, and UMA. Our findings are novel and surprising: quantitative evaluations of DeFi’s distributed governance strategies reveal a failure to achieve political decentralization.
Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT) > Other
Fonds National de la Recherche - FnR
Researchers ; Professionals ; General public
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/48726
http://hdl.handle.net/10125/80074
FnR ; FNR13342933 > Gilbert Fridgen > DFS > Paypal-fnr Pearl Chair In Digital Financial Services > 01/01/2020 > 31/12/2024 > 2019

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