Reference : Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules
Scientific journals : Article
Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations
Finance
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/47449
Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules
English
Howarth, David mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) >]
Asimakopoulos, Ioannis mailto [University of Luxembourg > Law]
9-Jun-2021
Journal of Common Market Studies
Blackwell
Yes
International
0021-9886
1468-5965
Oxford
United Kingdom
[en] banking union ; single resolution mechanism ; Bank recovery and resolution directive ; deposit guarantee schemes ; MREL (minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities) ; liberal intergovernmentalism
[en] Our contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution
rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited
access to and insufficient availability of EU resolution funds and inadequate national deposit guarantee
schemes in most EU member states, in conjunction with the relatively high minimum requirements
for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for many EU banks. In many cases,
these requirements are unlikely ever to be met – particularly for retail banks most likely to require
resolution in the euro periphery. We offer a liberal intergovernmentalist analysis to explain the inadequacy
of the EU resolution regime by examining German and French government preferences
on EU rules on bank capital requirements agreed earlier in 2013 and national deposit guarantee
schemes agreed in 2014. These government preferences were shaped significantly by the preferences
of national banks and bank associations.
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students ; General public
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/47449
10.1111/jcms.13212
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.13212
FnR ; FNR13712846 > David Howarth > BEEBS > Building Effective European Banking Supervision > 01/09/2020 > 31/08/2023 > 2019

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