banking union; single resolution mechanism; Bank recovery and resolution directive; deposit guarantee schemes; MREL (minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities); liberal intergovernmentalism
Résumé :
[en] Our contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited
access to and insufficient availability of EU resolution funds and inadequate national deposit guarantee
schemes in most EU member states, in conjunction with the relatively high minimum requirements
for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for many EU banks. In many cases, these requirements are unlikely ever to be met – particularly for retail banks most likely to require resolution in the euro periphery. We offer a liberal intergovernmentalist analysis to explain the inadequacy of the EU resolution regime by examining German and French government preferences on EU rules on bank capital requirements agreed earlier in 2013 and national deposit guarantee schemes agreed in 2014. These government preferences were shaped significantly by the preferences of national banks and bank associations.
