Reference : The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fir...
Scientific journals : Article
Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
Howarth, David mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (FHSE) > Department of Social Sciences (DSOC) >]
Fontan, Clément mailto [UC Louvain/Université Saint-Louis > ISPOLE/IEE > > Professor]
Politics and Governance
Reforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
[en] accountability ; Bundesbank ; Bundestag ; Court of Justice of the European Union ; European Central Bank ; European Parliament ; German Federal Constitutional Court ; monetary policy ; ordo-liberalism ; principal-agent analysis
[en] In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal-agent analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents us with a new understanding of the relationship between the ECB, other EU institutions and Eurozone member states. Existing principal-agent analyses of the ECB focus upon its relations with other EU-level institutions and point to the limited ex ante control mechanisms and efforts to reinforce ex post control mechanisms—notably European Parliament oversight. The FCC ruling and the ECB’s reaction demonstrate the relative importance of national level controls over the ECB agent. This article understands the role of private plaintiffs in Germany as a form of ‘fire alarm’ on ECB policymaking against the background of weak ex post controls at the EU-level.
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students ; General public

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