A Verifiable and Practical Lattice-Based Decryption Mix Net with External Auditing

Boyen, Xavier; Haines, Thomas; Mueller, Johannes

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_17

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A Verifiable and Practical Lattice-Based Decryption Mix Net with External Auditing

Boyen, Xavier; Haines, Thomas; Mueller, Johannes

2020 • In Computer Security - ESORICS 2020 - 25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2020, Guildford, UK, September 14-18, 2020, Proceedings, Part II

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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/45497

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10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_17

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Disciplines :

Computer science

Author, co-author :

Boyen, Xavier

Haines, Thomas

Mueller, Johannes ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA

External co-authors :

yes

Language :

English

Title :

A Verifiable and Practical Lattice-Based Decryption Mix Net with External Auditing

Publication date :

2020

Event name :

ESORICS 2020 - 25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

Event date :

September 14-18, 2020

Main work title :

Computer Security - ESORICS 2020 - 25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2020, Guildford, UK, September 14-18, 2020, Proceedings, Part II

Peer reviewed :

Peer reviewed

Focus Area :

Security, Reliability and Trust

FnR Project :

FNR11747298 - Secure, Usable And Robust Cryptographic Voting Systems, 2017 (01/08/2018-31/07/2022) - Peter Y. A. Ryan

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since 14 January 2021

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