A Verifiable and Practical Lattice-Based Decryption Mix Net with External Auditing

Boyen, Xavier; Haines, Thomas; MUELLER, Johannes

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_17

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A Verifiable and Practical Lattice-Based Decryption Mix Net with External Auditing

Boyen, Xavier; Haines, Thomas; MUELLER, Johannes

2020 • In Computer Security - ESORICS 2020 - 25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2020, Guildford, UK, September 14-18, 2020, Proceedings, Part II

Peer reviewed

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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/45497

DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_17

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Détails

Disciplines :

Sciences informatiques

Auteur, co-auteur :

Boyen, Xavier

Haines, Thomas

MUELLER, Johannes ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > APSIA

Co-auteurs externes :

yes

Langue du document :

Anglais

Titre :

A Verifiable and Practical Lattice-Based Decryption Mix Net with External Auditing

Date de publication/diffusion :

2020

Nom de la manifestation :

ESORICS 2020 - 25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

Date de la manifestation :

September 14-18, 2020

Titre de l'ouvrage principal :

Computer Security - ESORICS 2020 - 25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2020, Guildford, UK, September 14-18, 2020, Proceedings, Part II

Peer reviewed :

Peer reviewed

Focus Area :

Security, Reliability and Trust

Projet FnR :

FNR11747298 - Secure, Usable And Robust Cryptographic Voting Systems, 2017 (01/08/2018-31/07/2022) - Peter Y. A. Ryan

Disponible sur ORBilu :

depuis le 14 janvier 2021

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145 (dont 5 Unilu)

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Bibliographie

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