The Duty of Care in EU Public Law - A Principle Between Discretion and Proportionality

[en] This article concentrates on the ‘duty of care’ or ‘diligence’, a principle that has become ubiquitous in CJEU case law due to its central role in calibrating the intensity of judicial review of EU acts on the legislative, regulatory and single-case decision-making levels. It explores the development of the principle and critically reviews its use as well as whether it actually achieves the demands placed on it. The article further examines the tools developed and the emergence of the duty of care as a principle conferring individual rights in various procedural contexts. It describes how the duty of care has become a central link between on the one hand, a separation of powers-inspired respect for discretion of the institutions and bodies of the EU and, on the other hand, ensuring a rule of law based effective review of the legality of acts – a central feature in the EU specific approach to developing proportionality.

Disciplines :

European & international law

Author, co-author :

HOFMANN, Herwig ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Law Research Unit

External co-authors :

Language :

English

Title :

The Duty of Care in EU Public Law - A Principle Between Discretion and Proportionality

Publication date :

2020

Journal title :

Review of European Administrative Law

ISSN :

1874-7981

eISSN :

1874-7973

Publisher :

Paris Legal, Zutphen, Netherlands

Peer reviewed :

Peer Reviewed verified by ORBi

Focus Area :

Law / European Law

Available on ORBilu :

since 13 July 2020

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Bibliography

For one example, see Case T-108/08 Davidoff v OHIM [2011] EU:T:2011:391, para 19. Sometimes, both care and diligence are used together. See eg Case T-204/03 Haladjian v Commission [2006] EU:T:2006:273, para 29: ‘when the Commission decides to proceed with an investigation, it must … conduct it with the requisite care, seriousness and diligence so as to be able to assess with full knowledge of the case the factual and legal particulars submitted for its appraisal by the complainants.’
See, for an overview, Bucura Mihaescu, The right to good administration (Nomos 2015) 394-405 with many further references.
Duties of ‘solicitude’ or ‘care’ in the context of EU staff cases are used as criteria to balance the reciprocal rights and obligations of the employer and the EU’s staff: see eg Case C-321/85 Schwiering v Court of Auditors [1986] EU:C:1986:408, para 18.
The CJEU obliges decisions concerning the situation of an official to be based on careful and impartial consideration of all the factors, especially taking into account not only the interests of the service, but also those of the official concerned: see eg Case T-203/97 Forvass v Commission [1999] EU:T:1999:135, para 3; Case C-181/03 P Nardone v Commission [2005] EU:C:2004:397, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 54).
See, for example, Joined Cases T-198/95, T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98 and T-225/99 Comafrica v Commission [2001] EU:T:2001:184, para 144 establishing that ‘the finding of an error or irregularity on the part of an institution is not sufficient in itself to attract the non-contractual liability of the Community unless that error or irregularity is characterized by a lack of diligence or care’ (emphasis added). This goes back to early cases granting damages where bodies ‘gravely neglected the duties of supervision required by a normal standard of care’ (Joined Cases 19/60, 21/60, 2/61 and 3/61 Société Fives Lille Cail v High Authority [1961] EU:C:1961:22, 297) or where the bodies had displayed an obvious lack of care (Joined Cases 29/63, 31/63, 36/63, 39/63 to 47/63, 50/63 and 51/63 Providence and Others v High Authority [1965] EU:C:1966:29, 937).
See, with further references, HCH Hofmann, ‘Inquisitorial Procedures and General Principles of Law: The Duty of Care in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ in L Jacobs (ed), The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 153-166;
B Mihaescu Evans, The right to good administration at the crossroads of the various sources of fundamental rights in the EU integrated administrative system (Nomos 2015) 392-426.
Case 6/54 Netherlands v High Authority [1955] EU:C:1955:5, 112 (English language version) and 220 (French version). I thank Bucura Mihaescu Evans for having pointed out to me the origin of the duty of care in this case, and for the many discussions we have had about this during the past years.
ibid. See, for later case law qualifying provisions in EU law requiring the gathering and allowing for real taking into account of all relevant information prior to decision-making as essential procedural requirements: Case C-644/17 Eurobolt [2019] EU:C:2019:555, paras 50-51;
Case C-183/16 P Tilly-Sabco v Commission [2017] EU:C:2017:704, para 114 and Case C-263/95 Germany v Commission [1998] EU:C:1998:47.
Case 42/84 Remia v Commission [1985] EU:C:1985:327, para 34, stating in summary under what is now known as the ‘Remia formula’: that the CJEU will limit judicial review of discretionary powers to verifying compliance with the relevant procedural rules, adequate reasoning and whether the act is beset by manifest errors of appraisal and whether there has been a ‘misuse of powers’.
Case 6/54 Netherlands v High Authority [1955] EU:C:1955:1, Opinion of AG Roemer, 133.
Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] EU:C:1991:438.
See, especially, Case C-16/90 Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] EU:C:1991:233, Opinion of AG Van Gerven, para 28. An in-depth but pre-CFR assessment is given by H Peter Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (Hart 1999) 104–65.
For a thorough discussion in various contexts of the notion of care, diligence and solicitude in the case law of the CJEU in relation to principles of good administration, rights to damages and personnel matters, see Bucura Mihaescu Evans, The right to good administration at the crossroads of the various sources of fundamental rights in the EU integrated administrative system (Nomos 2015) 392-426.
Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] EU:C:1991:438, para 14.
Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] EU:C:1991:438.
See eg Case 6/54 Netherlands v High Authority [1955] EU:C:1955:5 and Case C-338/10 GLS [2012] EU:C:2012:158, paras 34 and 36-37.
[1] Case T-167/94 Nölle v Council and Commission [1995] EU:T:1995:169, para 76.
See eg Case C-47/07 P Masdar (UK) Ltd v Commission [2008] EU:C:2008:726, para 92: ‘That duty of care is inherent in the principle of sound administration.’;
Case C-556/14 P Holcim (Romania) SA v European Commission [2016] EU:C:2016:207, para 80:
‘It must be noted, first of all, that, in accordance with the principle of sound administration, the EU institutions must examine all the relevant particulars of a case with care and impartiality and gather all the factual and legal information necessary to exercise their discretion’ (making further reference to Case C-534/10 P Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO [2012] EU:C:2012:813, para 51) and
Case C-337/15 P European Ombudsman v Claire Staelen [2017] EU:C:2017:256, para 34: ‘It must also be borne in mind that the duty to act diligently which is inherent in the principle of sound administration and applies generally to the actions of the EU administration in its relations with the public requires that that administration act with care and caution.’
See also, for the General Court, eg Case T-286/09 Intel Corp. v Commission [2014] EU:T:2014:547, para 359: ‘In that regard, it should be noted that the guarantees afforded by the European Union legal order in administrative proceedings include, in particular, the principle of sound administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which entails the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case’ with reference to Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission [2003] EU:T:2003:245, para 404 and the case-law cited therein.
See especially the Court of Justice’s appeal decision in the max.mobil case, in which it overturned the General Court’s assessment of the obligation of ‘diligent and impartial treatment of a complaint is associated with the right to sound administration which is one of the general principles that are observed in a State governed by the rule of law and are common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States’ (Case T-54/99 max.mobil v Commission [2002] EU:T:2002:20, para 48) in Case C-141/02 P Commission v max-mobil [2005] EU:C:2005:98, paras 68–75.
See eg Case C-337/15 P European Ombudsman vClaire Stehlen [2017] EU:C:2017:256, para 34;
Case C-556/14 P Holcim (Romania) SA v European Commission [2016] EU:C:2016:207, para 80;
Case C-534/10 P Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO [2012] EU:C:2012:813, para 51
and Case T-326/07 Cheminova and others v Commission [2009] EU:T:2009:299, para 228.
Case C-337/15 P European Ombudsman vClaire Stehlen [2017] EU:C:2017:256, para 34.
See eg J. Dupont Lassale, Le Principe de Bonne Administration en Droit de l’Union Européenne (Bruylandt 2013) 92.
H Peter Nehl, ‘Good administration as procedural right and/or general principle?’ in HCH Hofmann and AH Türk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2009) 322-351, at 350.
J Ziller, Droit à une Bonne Administration (Juriclasseur Libertés 2007) 7-8.
The result is that, while the right to good administration under Article 41 CFR is addressed only to EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as a general principle of law under Article 6(3) TEU, the duty of care is also applicable to Member States acting in the scope of EU law. See HCH Hofmann and Bucura Mihaescu, ‘The Relation between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law – Good Administration as the Test-Case’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 73.
Case C-166/13 Sophie Mukarubega v Préfet de police, Préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis [2014] EU:C:2014:2336.
Case C-166/13 Sophie Mukarubega v Préfet de police, Préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis [2014] EU:C:2014:2336, para 48
with reference to Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] EU:C:1991:438, para 14
and Case C-349/07 Sopropé [2008] EU:C:2008:746, para 50.
Case C-362/14 Schrems v DPC [2015] EU:C:2015:650.
Case C-362/14 Schrems v DPC [2015] EU:C:2015:650, para 63.
D. Ritleng, ‘Judicial Review of EU Administrative Discretion: How Far Does the Separation of Powers Matter?’ in J. Mendes and I. Venzke, Allocating Authority: Who Should Do What in European and International Law? (Bloomsbury 2018) 183-216.
See eg Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag [2015] EU:C:2015:400, para 69 (regarding an ECB purchase programme to be implemented by individual acts under Article 18 of the ESCB Statutes) and
Case T-333/10 Animal Trading Company (ATC) and Others v Commission [2013] EU:C:2013:451, paras 84-94 (concerning a general decision by the Commission addressed at the Member States which had negative effects on the plaintiffs).
See also Joana Mendes, ‘Discretion, Care and Public Interests in the EU Administration: Probing the Limits of Law’ in HCH Hofmann and Jacques Ziller (eds), Accountability in the EU – The Role of the European Ombudsman (Edward Elgar 2017) 156.
See Joined Cases C-191/09 P and C-200/09 P Council v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP [2012] EU:C:2012:78, para 113.
See Case T-285/03 Agraz and others v Commission [2005] EU:T:2005:109, at para 49.
See Case T-475/07 Dow AgroSciences and others v Commission [2011] EU:T:2011:445, para 154.
See Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:209, para 171 and Case T-70/99 Alpharma v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:210, para 182.
See Case C-425/08 Enviro Tech (Europe) [2009] EU:C:2009:635, para 62 and
Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v Commission [2005] EU:T:2005:458, para 85.
Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v EP and Council [2011] EU:C:2011:290, para 65.
Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others [2010] EU:C:2010:321, para 55.
This approach was highlighted as the leading model of review by Koen Lenaerts, writing extra-judicially in Koen Lenaerts, The European Court of Justice and Process-oriented Review, College of Europe, Department of European Legal Studies, Research Paper in Law 01/2012.
Case C-128/17 Poland v European Parliament and Council [2019] EU:C:2019:194.
Case C-128/17 Poland v European Parliament and Council [2019] EU:C:2019:194, paras 45, 100, 136.
See, in broader terms and including questions of systematised information gathering through impact assessments in judicial review: A Alemanno, ‘Impact Assessment before Courts’ in C Radaelli and C Dunlop (eds), Handbook of Regulatory Impact Assessment (Edward Elgar 2016) 127-141.
Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making [2016] OJ L123/1.
ibid, stating in point 12: ‘Impact assessments are a tool to help the three Institutions reach well-informed decisions (…) . Impact assessments should cover the existence, scale and consequences of a problem and the question whether or not Union action is needed. They should map out alternative solutions and, where possible, potential short and long-term costs and benefits, assessing the economic, environmental and social impacts in an integrated and balanced way and using both qualitative and quantitative analyses. (…) Impact assessments should be based on accurate, objective and complete information and should be proportionate as regards their scope and focus.’
Case C-72/15 Rosneft [2017] EU:C:2017:236, para 73;
Case C-362/14 Schrems I [2015] EU:C:2015:650, para 95
and Case C-562/13 Abdida [2014] EU:C:2014:2453, para 45.
§ 46 of the German administrative procedure act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, VwVfG). Despite criticism in the legal literature, this legislation has been upheld by the highest administrative court, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwGE 70, 143, 147) which did not question the constitutionality of the provision and allowed for review concentrated on substantive grounds. Judicial review of violations of procedural provisions are relegated to review by declaratory action irrespective of the validity of the administrative act beset by the procedural irregularities. See, with further references, Stelkens, Bonk and Sachs (eds) Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (9th edn, Beck 2018) § 46 paras 5-6.
See, for some further considerations, the comparative studies prepared for the Seminar of the Association of High Administrative Courts and Conseils d’Etat (ACA-Europe) in Cologne, 2-4 December 2018.
See eg Section 3.2. (entitled ‘Duty of care and weighting of interests’) of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht), AWB of June 4, 1992, Staatblad, 1992, 315.
J Mendes, ‘Discretion, Care and Public Interests in the EU Administration: Probing the Limits of Law’ in HCH Hofmann and J Ziller (eds), Accountability in the EU – The Role of the European Ombudsman (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 156.
Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brinks France [1998] EU:C:1998:154, para 60, 62 (referring also to the obligation to take into account ex officio also matters not expressly raised by parties to a procedure if foreseeably relevant to a decision taken by a public body).
Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] EU:C:1991:438.
Case C-408/04 P Commission v Salzgitter [2008] EU:C:2007:491, Opinion of AG Bot, para 265.
Case C-405/07 P Netherlands v Commission [2008] EU:C:2008:613, para 56: ‘where a Community institution has a wide discretion, the review of observance of guarantees conferred by the Community legal order in administrative procedures is of fundamental importance. The Court of Justice has had occasion to specify that those guarantees include, in particular for the competent institution, the obligations to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the individual case and to give an adequate statement of the reasons for its decision (see Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I-5469, paragraph 14; Joined Cases C-258/90 and C-259/90 Pesquerias De Bermeo and Naviera Laida v Commission [1992] ECR I-2901, paragraph 26; and Spain v Lenzing, paragraph 58)’.
Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] EU:C:2005:87, para 39.
See eg Article 11 TFEU, which requires that ‘environmental protection requirements . . . be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development’ or Article 168(1) first paragraph TFEU, which requires that ‘a high level of human health protection . . . be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities’. See, in that respect, the findings of the General Court in eg Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:209, para 158.
See Case C-338/10 GLS [2011] EU:C:2011:636, Opinion of AG Bot, paras 98ff.
Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brinks France [1998] EU:C:1998:154, paras 60, 62 – linking this duty to the principle of sound or good administration.
See Case C-338/10 GLS [2011] EU:C:2011:636, Opinion of AG Bot, paras 103-105 – referring to relevant statistics published by Eurostat.
Case T-369/06 Holland Malt v Commission [2009] EU:T:2009:319, para 195.
Case C-525/04 P Spain v Lenzing [2007] EU:C:2007:698, para 57.
Reference to independent scientific expertise may, in certain cases, be protected in the framework of fundamental rights, especially the right to a fair hearing: see eg Case C-276/01 Steffensen [2003] EU:C:2003:228, paras 73, 80.
See eg Case C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P Land Oberösterreich and Austria v Commission [2007] EU:C:2007:510, para 32.
Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] EU:C:2009:438;
Case C-212/91 Angelopharm [1994] EU:C:1994:21
and Case C-405/07 P Netherlands v Commission [2008] EU:C:2008:613, paras 56 and 67.
Case C-405/07 P Netherlands v Commission [2008] EU:C:2008:613, paras 56 and 61.
Case T-326/99 Fern Olivieri v Commission [2003] EU:T:2003:351, para 68; Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:209, para 158
and Case T-70/99 Alpharma v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:210, para 171. This approach is in compliance with Art 114 TFEU (Art 95(3) EC), which obliges the Commission, in the case of legislative proposals in these matters, to take into ‘account in particular any new development based on scientific facts’.
Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:209, para 172
and Case T-70/99 Alpharma v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:210, para 183.
Case C-525/04 P Spain v Lenzing [2007] EU:C:2007:698, para 57.
Case C-290/07 P Commission v Scott [2010] EU:C:2010:480, para 90.
Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] EU:C:1991:438
and Case C-16/90 Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen (Nölle I) [1991] EU:C:1991:402, para 29.
Case C-367/95 P Sytraval [1998] EU:C:1998:154, para 60, 62 – referring also to the obligation to take into account ex officio also matters not expressly raised by parties to a procedure.
Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] EU:C:2005:87, para 39.
Case 6/54 Netherlands v High Authority [1955] EU:C:1955:5, 112 (English language version) and 220 (French version).
This is the point explicitly contested by the German Constitutional Court’s (Bundesverfassungsgericht) explicit expression of discontent with the CJEU’s approach to review of proportionality leading to an ultra vires act in its decision of 5 May 2020 joined cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16 PSPP. English version at: .
See eg Case C-47/07 P Masdar (UK) Ltd v Commission [2008] EU:C:2008:726, para 92.
See eg Case C-337/15 P European Ombudsman vClaire Stehlen [2017] EU:C:2017:256, para 34;
Case C-556/14 P Holcim (Romania) SA v European Commission [2016] EU:C:2016:207, para 80;
Case C-534/10 P Brookfield New Zealand and Elaris v CPVO [2012] EU:C:2012:813, para 51
and Case T-326/07 Cheminova and other v Commission [2009] EU:T:2009:299, para 228.
Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v Commission [2005] EU:T:2005:458, para 86.
Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v Commission [2005] EU:T:2005:458, para 71.
Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v Commission [2005] EU:T:2005:458, para 86.
Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:209, para 171.
Case T-70/99 Alpharma v Council [2002] EU:T:2002:210, para 182.
Case T-285/03 Agraz and Others v Commission [2005] EU:T:2005:109.
Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission [2005] EU:T:2005:458, para 88
and Case T-285/03 Agraz and Others v Commission [2005] EU:T:2005:109, paras 49-54.
Case C-337/15 P European Ombudsman v Claire Staelen [2017] EU:C:2017:256, para 41.
ibid. See, for clarification, Case C-44/16 P Dyson v Commission [2017] EU:C:2017:357, para 49, 50. The complexity of cases in the constellation of Staelen nonetheless arises from the fact that not only the violated individual right is a right under the duty of care, but also the question of the breach of duties contains a care-related analysis.
See, as an example, the facts underlying Case C-104/13 Olainfarm [2104] EU:C:2014:2316 and the Court’s view in paras 35-41.
Case C-558/07 SPCM and others [2009] EU:C:2009:142, Opinion of AG Kokott, paras 73-77.
ibid. AG Kokott’s statements made with respect to legislative acts are equally relevant to the review of non-legislative activity of executive actors.
See, for example, Case T-333/10 Animal Trade Company (ATC) [2013] EU:T:2013:451, para 103. Here the General Court concludes that violation of the principle of care results in a violation of the principle of proportionality.
Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag(OMT) [2015] EU:C:2015:400.
Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag(OMT) [2015] EU:C:2015:400, paras 66-69.
C-493/17 Weiss and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000 (Grand Chamber), paras 36-42.
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 5 May 2020 joined cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16, para 156. English version at .
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 5 May 2020 joined cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16, para 155. Therefore, the GCC held that it was not bound by the CJEU findings of the legality of the ECB action established in Weiss and Others.
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 5 May 2020 PSPP joined cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16, paras 133.
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 5 May 2020 PSPP joined cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16, para 144.
In this article this had been described as reviewing whether quantitatively and qualitatively and cognitively.
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 5 May 2020 PSPP joined cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16, PSPP paras 123, 141, 160. In applying this standard, referred to as “wertende Gesamtbetrachtung”, the GCC then based its rejection of the CJEU’s approach on the fact that the CJEU had not properly balanced secondary economic effects of the ECB’s monetary policy acts in the decision on the choice of the legal basis, declaring a measure as an act of monetary policy, or in the exercise of its monetary policy powers. The GCC thus requests from the CJEU a level of review going beyond the assessment of the relevant facts and cognitively basing its judgement on the facts so established as would be the case under the duty of care.
C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, para 62.
See eg C-69/10 Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration ECLI:EU:C:2011:524, paras 56, 57 with reference to C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-8613, paras 60-62.
C-585/16 Alheto EU:C:2018:584 (Grand Chamber), paras 113, 114.
Such as eg the requirement to ensure high levels of health and environmental protection in Article 114(3) TFEU.
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 5 May 2020 PSPP joined cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16, paras 146-153.
To illustrate this point, I refer to the GCC’s considerations as to whether ‘economically unviable companies’ would be artificially kept afloat. How the idea of economic viability can be detached from market and regulatory conditions is not clear and is not explained by the GCC. Further the GCC requests a proportionality review to consider that some Member States may not implement the ‘necessary consolidation and reform measures,’ ‘increase new borrowing’, conduct ‘investment programmes’ and refrain from pursuing ‘a sound budgetary policy’. (German Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 PSPP joined cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16, paras 170, 171). Each display a certain undisclosed but underlying political and economic belief, which could be anchored in constitutional choices but then needs to be counter-balance with other elements including provisions of the Charter and of horizontal provisions in the Treaties. See for a discussion of these dangers: Dariusz Adamski, ‘The Faustian bargain. How evolving economic and political beliefs have redefined the European economic constitution’, in: HCH Hofmann, Katerina Pantazatou and Giovanni Zaccaroni (eds), The Metamorphosis of the European Economic Constitution (Edward Elgar 2019), 25-57.
Especially in single market matters (eg Case 8/74 Dassonville ECR 1974, I-838, para 5) and anti-discrimination cases where the discrimination arises not by law but from the factual circumstances of a case (eg Case 14/83 Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR I-1892 para 18; C-300/06 Voß v Land Berlin [2007] ECR I-10592, para 38).
C-59/83 Biovilac ECLI:EU:C:1984:380, para 22.
C-435/02 Springer v Zeitungsverlag Niederrhein and Others ECLI:EU:C:2004:552, para 49
As an example for many: C-110/05 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2009:66, paras 37-40
Joana Mendes, ‘Discretion, Care and Public Interests in the EU Administration: Probing the Limits of Law’ in HCH Hofmann and Jacques Ziller (eds), Accountability in the EU – The Role of the European Ombudsman (Edward Elgar 2017) 156.
Joana Mendes, ‘Discretion, Care and Public Interests in the EU Administration: Probing the Limits of Law’ in HCH Hofmann and Jacques Ziller (eds), Accountability in the EU – The Role of the European Ombudsman, 156-159.
See the discussion above on the Inter-institutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making [2016] OJ L123/1, stating in point 12: ‘Impact assessments should cover the existence, scale and consequences of a problem and the question whether or not Union action is needed. They should map out alternative solutions and, where possible, potential short and long-term costs and benefits, assessing the economic, environmental and social impacts in an integrated and balanced way and using both qualitative and quantitative analyses. … Impact assessments should be based on accurate, objective and complete information and should be proportionate as regards their scope and focus’.
See, for a more recent example, the above cited Case C-128/17 Poland v European Parliament and Council [2019] EU:C:2019:194.
See, for abstract general administrative rule making procedures, Article II-3 ReNEUAL model rules and, for single-case decision making, Article III-10 ReNEUAL model rules, linking the principle of investigation with the duty of care. See, for the online 2014 version of the model codes, HCH Hofmann and others, ‘ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure’ (reNEUAL, 2014) accessed 16 March 2020 and Paul Craig, HCH Hofmann, J-P Schneider, Jacques Ziller (eds.) ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure (2017 version of model codes, Oxford University Press 2017).
See Article III-10(1) on the principle of investigation.
See ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and of the Council for an open, efficient and independent European Union administration’ (European Parliament, 6 June 2016) accessed 16 March 2020, especially Article 9(1) stating: ‘The competent authority shall investigate the case carefully and impartially. It shall take into consideration all relevant factors and gather all necessary information to adopt a decision’.
Paul Craig, HCH Hofmann, J-P Schneider and Jacques Ziller (eds.) ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure (2017 version of model codes, Oxford University Press 2017) 111.
The notion of facts in the case law of the CJEU was developed with respect to the classification of non-legal theories, including economic theory, as facts in the case law of the CJEU. Thereby, the scope of the matters subject only to limited review has become more circumscribed than in earlier case law. The first wave of cases where economic theory, and its conclusions as well as technical assessments were subject to the same review as facts was in the early 2000s in: max.mobil (Case T-54/99 max.mobil v Commission [2002] EU:T:2002:20), Airtours (Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] EU:T:2002:146),
Tetra Laval (Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] EU:T:2002:264, upheld on appeal in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] EU:C:2005:87)
and also Schneider (Case T-351/03 Schneider Electric v Commission [2007] EU:T:2007:212)
Case C-72/15 Rosneft [2017] EU:C:2017:236, para 73;
Case C-362/14 Schrems I [2015] EU:C:2015:650, para 95
and Case C-562/13 Abdida [2014] EU:C:2014:2453, para 45.