Communication publiée dans un ouvrage (Colloques, congrès, conférences scientifiques et actes)
ÆGIS: Shielding Vulnerable Smart Contracts Against Attacks
FERREIRA TORRES, Christof; STEICHEN, Mathis; NORVILL, Robert et al.
2020In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS ’20), October 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan
Peer reviewed
 

Documents


Texte intégral
Aegis_ASIACCS_2020.pdf
Preprint Auteur (805.58 kB)
Télécharger

Tous les documents dans ORBilu sont protégés par une licence d'utilisation.

Envoyer vers



Détails



Mots-clés :
Ethereum; Smart contracts; Exploit prevention; Security updates
Résumé :
[en] In recent years, smart contracts have suffered major exploits, cost- ing millions of dollars. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts are deployed on a blockchain. As such, they cannot be modified once deployed. Though various tools have been proposed to detect vulnerable smart contracts, the majority fails to protect vulnera- ble contracts that have already been deployed on the blockchain. Only very few solutions have been proposed so far to tackle the issue of post-deployment. However, these solutions suffer from low precision and are not generic enough to prevent any type of attack. In this work, we introduce ÆGIS, a dynamic analysis tool that protects smart contracts from being exploited during runtime. Its capability of detecting new vulnerabilities can easily be extended through so-called attack patterns. These patterns are written in a domain-specific language that is tailored to the execution model of Ethereum smart contracts. The language enables the description of malicious control and data flows. In addition, we propose a novel mechanism to streamline and speed up the process of managing attack patterns. Patterns are voted upon and stored via a smart contract, thus leveraging the benefits of tamper-resistance and transparency provided by the blockchain. We compare ÆGIS to current state-of-the-art tools and demonstrate that our solution achieves higher precision in detecting attacks. Finally, we perform a large-scale analysis on the first 4.5 million blocks of the Ethereum blockchain, thereby confirming the occurrences of well reported and yet unreported attacks in the wild.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Auteur, co-auteur :
FERREIRA TORRES, Christof ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
STEICHEN, Mathis ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
NORVILL, Robert ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
FIZ PONTIVEROS, Beltran ;  University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Jonker, Hugo;  Open University of the Netherlands
MAUW, Sjouke ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Co-auteurs externes :
yes
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
ÆGIS: Shielding Vulnerable Smart Contracts Against Attacks
Date de publication/diffusion :
2020
Nom de la manifestation :
15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Date de la manifestation :
from 05-10-2020 to 09-10-2020
Titre de l'ouvrage principal :
Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS ’20), October 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Projet FnR :
FNR13192291 - Secure Blockchain Technologies For Finance, 2018 (01/10/2018-31/03/2022) - Christof Ferreira Torres
Disponible sur ORBilu :
depuis le 12 avril 2020

Statistiques


Nombre de vues
311 (dont 12 Unilu)
Nombre de téléchargements
495 (dont 25 Unilu)

Bibliographie


Publications similaires



Contacter ORBilu