[en] In recent years, smart contracts have suffered major exploits, cost- ing millions of dollars. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts are deployed on a blockchain. As such, they cannot be modified once deployed. Though various tools have been proposed to detect vulnerable smart contracts, the majority fails to protect vulnera- ble contracts that have already been deployed on the blockchain. Only very few solutions have been proposed so far to tackle the issue of post-deployment. However, these solutions suffer from low precision and are not generic enough to prevent any type of attack.
In this work, we introduce ÆGIS, a dynamic analysis tool that protects smart contracts from being exploited during runtime. Its capability of detecting new vulnerabilities can easily be extended through so-called attack patterns. These patterns are written in a domain-specific language that is tailored to the execution model of Ethereum smart contracts. The language enables the description of malicious control and data flows. In addition, we propose a novel mechanism to streamline and speed up the process of managing attack patterns. Patterns are voted upon and stored via a smart contract, thus leveraging the benefits of tamper-resistance and transparency provided by the blockchain. We compare ÆGIS to current state-of-the-art tools and demonstrate that our solution achieves higher precision in detecting attacks. Finally, we perform a large-scale analysis on the first 4.5 million blocks of the Ethereum blockchain, thereby confirming the occurrences of well reported and yet unreported attacks in the wild.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Author, co-author :
FERREIRA TORRES, Christof ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
STEICHEN, Mathis ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
NORVILL, Robert ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
FIZ PONTIVEROS, Beltran ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)
Jonker, Hugo; Open University of the Netherlands
MAUW, Sjouke ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
ÆGIS: Shielding Vulnerable Smart Contracts Against Attacks
Publication date :
2020
Event name :
15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Event date :
from 05-10-2020 to 09-10-2020
Main work title :
Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS ’20), October 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan