Bursuc, Sergiu ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Dragan, Constantin-Catalin; University of Surrey, UK
Kremer, Steve; INRIA France
External co-authors :
no
Language :
English
Title :
Private Votes on Untrusted Platforms: Models, Attacks and Provable Scheme
Publication date :
2019
Event name :
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EuroS&P 2019
Event date :
17-19 June 2019
Main work title :
Private Votes on Untrusted Platforms: Models, Attacks and Provable Scheme
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