[en] The establishment of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has pushed the constitutional
boundaries of agencification further. After elaborating on the SRB’s powers and
safeguards, one can argue that its governance structure combined with its policymaking
powers distinguish the SRB from all other agencies. While trying to assess its
legality of establishment and empowerment, this paper seeks to identify the nature of
the empowerment, whether Meroni is still fit for purpose, and whether the limits of
institutional balance have been bent or indeed broken. After expressing concerns as to
the SRB’s compliance with the current EU institutional framework, the paper offers
an alternative for exiting this constitutional deadlock by applying Weiler’s theory of
constitutional transformation. Such a solution would legitimize the SRB as well as
facilitate the functioning of Banking Union.
Disciplines :
Droit européen & international
Auteur, co-auteur :
ASIMAKOPOULOS, Ioannis ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Law Research Unit
Co-auteurs externes :
no
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Single Resolution Board: another Meroni extension or another Chapter to Europe's Constitutional Transformation?
