Reference : Implementation of a Leakage-Resilient ElGamal Key Encapsulation Mechanism
Scientific journals : Article
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
Security, Reliability and Trust
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/37481
Implementation of a Leakage-Resilient ElGamal Key Encapsulation Mechanism
English
Galindo, David [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Groszschädl, Johann mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Liu, Zhe [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Vadnala, Praveen Kumar [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Venkatesh, Srinivas Vivek [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Sep-2016
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Springer Verlag
6
3
229-238
Yes
2190-8508
2190-8516
New York
NY
[en] Secure Implementation ; Side-Channel Cryptanalysis ; Leakage-Resilient Cryptography ; Security Proof ; Public-Key Encryption ; Pairings
[en] Leakage-resilient cryptography aims to extend the rigorous guarantees achieved through the provable security paradigm to physical implementations. The constructions designed on basis of this new approach inevitably suffer from an Achilles heel: a bounded leakage assumption is needed. Currently, a huge gap exists between the theory of such designs and their implementation to confirm the leakage resilience in practice. The present work tries to narrow this gap for the leakage-resilient bilinear ElGamal key encapsulation mechanism (BEG-KEM) proposed by Kiltz and Pietrzak in 2010. Our first contribution is a variant of the bounded leakage and the only-computation-leaks model that is closer to practice. We weaken the restriction on the image size of the leakage functions in these models and only insist that the inputs to the leakage functions have sufficient min-entropy left, in spite of the leakage, with no limitation on the quantity of this leakage. We provide a novel security reduction for BEG-KEM in this relaxed leakage model using the generic bilinear group axiom. Secondly, we show that a naive implementation of the exponentiation in BEG-KEM makes it impossible to meet the leakage bound. Instead of trying to find an exponentiation algorithm that meets the leakage axiom (which is a non-trivial problem in practice), we propose an advanced scheme, BEG-KEM+, that avoids exponentiation by a secret value, but rather uses an encoding into the base group due to Fouque and Tibouchi. Thirdly, we present a software implementation of BEG-KEM+ based on the Miracl library and provide detailed experimental results. We also assess its (theoretical) resistance against power analysis attacks from a practical perspective, taking into account the state-of-the-art in side-channel cryptanalysis.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/37481
10.1007/s13389-016-0121-x
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13389-016-0121-x

File(s) associated to this reference

Fulltext file(s):

FileCommentaryVersionSizeAccess
Limited access
JCEN2016.pdfPublisher postprint1.76 kBRequest a copy

Bookmark and Share SFX Query

All documents in ORBilu are protected by a user license.