Reference : Automated Identification of Desynchronisation Attacks on Shared Secrets |
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book | |||
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science | |||
Security, Reliability and Trust | |||
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/37278 | |||
Automated Identification of Desynchronisation Attacks on Shared Secrets | |
English | |
Mauw, Sjouke ![]() | |
Smith, Zachary Daniel ![]() | |
Toro Pozo, Jorge Luis ![]() | |
Trujillo Rasua, Rolando ![]() | |
Sep-2018 | |
Automated Identification of Desynchronisation Attacks on Shared Secrets | |
Springer | |
Yes | |
International | |
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security | |
from 03-09-2018 to 07-09-2018 | |
[en] security ; desynchronisation ; key update | |
[en] Key-updating protocols are a class of communication protocol
that aim to increase security by having the participants change encryption keys between protocol executions. However, such protocols can be vulnerable to desynchronisation attacks, a denial of service attack in which the agents are tricked into updating their keys improperly, so that they are no longer able to communicate. In this work we introduce a method that can be used to automatically verify (or falsify) resistance to desynchronisation attacks for a range of protocols. This approach is then used to identify previously unreported vulnerabilities in two published RFID grouping protocols. | |
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students | |
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/37278 |
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