environmental innovation, tradable emission permits, interaction ‡ la Cournot.
Abstract :
[en] In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by firms that compete
ä la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits
regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that permits prices may increase after clean
technology adoption. Herein we show that, since strategic firms are able to predict
such increase, this results in a non-innovation equilibrium (even for very low adoption
costs). To the light of the previous result, we find a sufficient condition for the cap on
emissions to ensure positive innovation incentives.
Disciplines :
Microeconomics
Author, co-author :
ZANAJ, Skerdilajda ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Clean technology adoption under Cournot competition
Publication date :
2012
Journal title :
Strategic Behavior and the Environment
ISSN :
1944-012X
eISSN :
1944-0138
Publisher :
Now Publishers Inc, Hanover, United States - Massachusetts
