Gibt es bei Hegel das Problem des Realismus?

The paper examines whether Hegel, in his philosophy, assigns realism a systematically
relevant place or whether, in the face of absolute idealism, he takes realism to be obsolete.
Following a systematic specification of the realism issue, it will be demonstrated
that Hegel provides an astute analysis of certain types of realism and, in the Phenomenology
of Spirit, argues against immediate or direct realism in particular. Although Hegel
views the idealism-realism debate as philosophically futile, the doctrine of essence
of the Science of Logic stands for the realist notion according to which actuality is to be
conceived as the unity of essence and existence. In the Phenomenology of Spirit and in
the Science of Logic he demonstrates that realism has skeptical implications on the basis
of which this theory is untenable, although not unreasonable as such.