Abstract :
[en] We present a detection scheme for attacks on a
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) in which we leverage the connectivity of a
multistage process to detect attacks downstream from the point of
attack. Our methods form a control theoretic approach to CPS
security by characterizing a real water treatment facility with
a mathematical model; obtaining a residual (error) signal from
sensor measurements and sensor measurement estimates; and
finally using Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) and Bad-Data detection methods
to detect the presence of a sensor attack. In particular, the attacks
are designed so that they do not raise alarms on the detectors in
the same stage where the attack takes place, requiring detection
to take place on a separate part of the system. Proposed scheme is implemented on a real world water treatment facility. Extensive experiments are carried out and results show the significance of the proposed scheme.
Scopus citations®
without self-citations
7