Reference : Deniability in Quantum Cryptography
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Poster
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
Security, Reliability and Trust
Deniability in Quantum Cryptography
Atashpendar, Arash mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Roenne, Peter mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Ostrev, Dimiter mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Ryan, Peter mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
The 12th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2017)
Université Pierre et Marie Curie
[en] Quantum Cryptography ; Quantum Key Distribution ; Deniable Exchange ; Key Exchange ; Secure E-Voting ; Coercion-Resistance
[en] This poster describes ongoing work on deniability in quantum cryptography, an area of research that remains almost entirely unexplored in the quantum information processing literature. Deniability is a well-known and fundamental concept in classical cryptography and it can be defined as the ability for the sender of a message to deny the contents of a message or the very act of having participated in an exchange, e.g. having sent the said message. We discuss deniability in the context of quantum key exchange and address a particular problem, first discovered by Donald Beaver, where he claims that all QKD protocols are undeniable. The claim is that while we do get a one-time pad (OTP) using QKD, it does not provide the property of key equivocation as it is expected in the Shannon sense for a OTP. Intuitively, this difficulty lies in the quantum channel alone and it has to do with the fact that in QKD, while we generate entropy by expanding an initially short pre-shared key into an arbitrary longer secret key, we do so by exchanging information over a quantum as well as a classical channel, which could potentially leave a binding transcript of Alice's decisions to the final secret key. This is in contrast with the implicit assumption that Eve knows nothing about how two given parties have established their shared OTP in the first place. We discuss the importance of deniability in cryptography and its wide range of applications, along with cryptographic primitives other than key exchange where deniability might be a desired property. Finally, we present a series of fundamental open questions in this area of research and discuss quantum cryptographic primitives that lend themselves to devising deniable protocols.
Researchers ; Students

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