Abstract :
[en] To reach a common target of environmental quality,
countries can choose to commit to a stream of pollution
abatement right from the beginning of the game or decide
upon abatement at each moment of time. Though most
of the previous literature studies homogeneous strategies
where no country or all countries commit to a (same) predefined
policy, reality goes along a different way: some
countries make more efforts than others to reduce pollutant
emission. The main novelty of this paper resides in
the introduction of this kind of heterogeneous strategic
behavior currently observed among large pollution nations.
We find that the pollution level can be lower under heterogeneous
than under homogeneous strategies. A stringent
environmental quality target will induce the committed
player to produce an abatement effort that more than
compensates the free-riding attitude of the non-committed
player.
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