Chosen-name attacks: An overlooked class of type-flaw attacks

Reference : Chosen-name attacks: An overlooked class of type-flaw attacks


	Document type :	Scientific journals : Article
	Discipline(s) :	Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/25871

Title :	Chosen-name attacks: An overlooked class of type-flaw attacks
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Ceelen, Pieter [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
	Mauw, Sjouke [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
	Radomirovic, Sasa [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Publication date :	2008
Journal title :	Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
Publisher :	Elsevier
Volume :	197
Issue/season :	2
Pages :	31-43
Peer reviewed :	Yes
ISSN :	1571-0661
Keywords :	[en] security protocols ; automatic verification ; type-flaw attacks ; semantics
Abstract :	[en] In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has been overlooked in all significant protocol verification frameworks based on formal methods. We identify and classify new type-flaw attacks arising from this capability. Several examples of protocols that are vulnerable to this type of attack are given, including Lowe’s modification of KSL. The consequences for automatic verification tools are discussed.
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/25871
DOI :	10.1016/j.entcs.2007.12.015

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