Reference : Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : International economics
Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality
Picard, Pierre M mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Van Pottelsberghe, Bruno [Université Libre de Bruxelles - ULB]
Journal of Public Economics
Elsevier Science
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
[en] patent system ; quality ; intellectual property ; public firm organization
[en] The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination process. A higher effort in the examination process enhances the patent holders' protection in the judicial system and strengthens the screening of innovations with small inventive steps. We compare the quality of the examination process for various objectives of patent offices. Patent examination quality is the highest in an office maximizing incentives
to innovate and the lowest in that maximizing the number of granted patents. A rent-seeking patent office can provide good incentives to innovate if it does not set too high markups on fees.

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