[en] In the present paper we overlay boolean game with norms. Norms
distinguish illegal strategies from legal strategies. Two types of legal strategy and
legal Nash equilibrium are defined. These two equilibrium are viewed as solution
concepts for law abiding agents in norm augmented boolean games. Our formal
model is a combination of boolean games and so called input/output logic. We
study various complexity issues related to legal strategy and legal Nash equilibrium.
Disciplines :
Sciences informatiques
Auteur, co-auteur :
SUN, Xin ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Co-auteurs externes :
no
Langue du document :
Anglais
Titre :
Boolean Games with Norms
Date de publication/diffusion :
2015
Nom de la manifestation :
The 9th Multi-Disciplinary International Workshop on Artificial Intelligence 2015 (MIWAI)
