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Power in Norm Negotiation
Boella, Guido; van der Torre, Leon
2007In Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, First KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2007, Wroclaw, Poland, May 31 – June 1, 2007, Proceedings
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Keywords :
norm negotiation creates; contractual obligations; fulfilling goals of the agents
Abstract :
[en] In social mechanism design, norm negotiation creates individual or contractual obligations fulfilling goals of the agents. The social delegation cycle distinguishes among social goal negotiation, obligation and sanction negotiation and norm acceptance. Power may affect norm negotiation in various ways, and we therefore introduce a new formalization of the social delegation cycle based on power and dependence, without referring to the rule structure of norms, actions, decision variables, tasks, and so on.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Identifiers :
UNILU:UL-CONFERENCE-2010-283
Author, co-author :
Boella, Guido ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
van der Torre, Leon ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Power in Norm Negotiation
Publication date :
2007
Event name :
Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, First KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2007, Wroclaw, Poland, May 31 – June 1, 2007, Proceedings
Event date :
2007
Audience :
International
Main work title :
Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, First KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2007, Wroclaw, Poland, May 31 – June 1, 2007, Proceedings
Publisher :
Springer
ISBN/EAN :
978-3-540-72829-0
Collection name :
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4496
Pages :
436–446
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Commentary :
4496 Best paper award
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