Paper published in a book (Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings)
Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games
Sauro, Luigi; van der Torre, Leon; Villata, Serena
2009 • In Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, Third KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2009, Uppsala, Sweden, June 3-5, 2009. Proceedings
[en] Cooperative boolean games are coalitional games with both goals and costs associated to actions, and dependence networks for boolean games are a kind of social networks representing how the actions of other agents have an influence on the achievement of an agent’s goal. In this paper, we introduce two new types of dependence networks, called the abstract dependence network and the refined dependence network. Moreover, we show that the notion of stability is complete with respect to the solution concept of the core in the case of cooperative boolean games with costly actions. We present a reduction, called Δ-reduction, to pass from a cooperative boolean game G to game G′ without loosing solutions.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Identifiers :
UNILU:UL-CONFERENCE-2010-101
Author, co-author :
Sauro, Luigi ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
van der Torre, Leon ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Villata, Serena
External co-authors :
yes
Language :
English
Title :
Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games
Publication date :
2009
Event name :
Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, Third KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2009, Uppsala, Sweden, June 3-5, 2009. Proceedings
Event date :
2009
Audience :
International
Main work title :
Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, Third KES International Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2009, Uppsala, Sweden, June 3-5, 2009. Proceedings
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