Reference : Key Recovery Attacks Against NTRU-Based Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/24362
Key Recovery Attacks Against NTRU-Based Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
English
Chenal, Massimo mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Tang, Qiang mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Sep-2015
Information Security - 18th International Conference, ISC 2015
Yes
Information Security - 18th International Conference, ISC 2015
September 9-11, 2015
[en] A key recovery attack allows an attacker to recover the pri-
vate key of an underlying encryption scheme when given a number of
decryption oracle accesses. Previous research has shown that most exist-
ing Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) schemes su er from this
attack. In this paper, we propose e cient key recovery attacks against
two NTRU-based SHE schemes due to Lopez-Alt et al. (2012) and Bos et
al. (2013), which have not gained much attention in the literature. Paral-
lel to our work, Dahab, Galbraith and Morais (2015) have also proposed
similar attacks but only for speci c parameter settings. In comparison,
our attacks apply to all parameter settings and are more e cient.
SnT
Fonds National de la Recherche - FnR
Researchers
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/24362

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