Reference : Key Recovery Attacks Against NTRU-Based Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes |
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book | |||
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science | |||
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/24362 | |||
Key Recovery Attacks Against NTRU-Based Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes | |
English | |
Chenal, Massimo ![]() | |
Tang, Qiang ![]() | |
Sep-2015 | |
Information Security - 18th International Conference, ISC 2015 | |
Yes | |
Information Security - 18th International Conference, ISC 2015 | |
September 9-11, 2015 | |
[en] A key recovery attack allows an attacker to recover the pri-
vate key of an underlying encryption scheme when given a number of decryption oracle accesses. Previous research has shown that most exist- ing Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) schemes su er from this attack. In this paper, we propose e cient key recovery attacks against two NTRU-based SHE schemes due to Lopez-Alt et al. (2012) and Bos et al. (2013), which have not gained much attention in the literature. Paral- lel to our work, Dahab, Galbraith and Morais (2015) have also proposed similar attacks but only for speci c parameter settings. In comparison, our attacks apply to all parameter settings and are more e cient. | |
SnT | |
Fonds National de la Recherche - FnR | |
Researchers | |
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/24362 |
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