No full text
Eprint already available on another site (E-prints, Working papers and Research blog)
Institutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach
Boucekkine, Raouf; Prieur, Fabien; Zou, Benteng
2015
 

Files


Full Text
No document available.

Send to



Details



Keywords :
institutional dynamics; lobbying games; stochastic differential games
Abstract :
[en] We propose an analysis of institutional dynamics under uncertainty by the means of a stochastic differential lobbying game with two main ingredients. The rst one is uncertainty inherent in the institutional process itself. The second one has to do with the crucial role of resource windfalls in economic and political outcomes, shaping lobbying power and adding a second source of uncertainty. First, we focus on uncertainty surrounding the institutional process only and show that its main consequence is the existence of multiple equilibria with very distinct features: symmetric equilibria which lead the economy to reach almost surely a stable pointwise institutional steady state in the long run even in the absence of the retaliation motive put forward by the deterministic lobbying literature, and asymmetric equilibria which only show up under uncertainty and do no allow for stochastic convergence to a steady state. Second, when accounting for the two sources of uncertainty together with resource revenue-dependent lobbying power, we show that revenue volatility tends to stabilize institutional dynamics compared to the deterministic counterpart.
Disciplines :
Macroeconomics & monetary economics
Author, co-author :
Boucekkine, Raouf
Prieur, Fabien
Zou, Benteng  ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)
Language :
English
Title :
Institutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach
Publication date :
2015
Available on ORBilu :
since 17 December 2015

Statistics


Number of views
67 (10 by Unilu)
Number of downloads
0 (0 by Unilu)

Bibliography


Similar publications



Contact ORBilu