Delegation and Commission leadership in Economic and Monetary Union

The aim of this contribution is to explore Commission leadership in terms of the powers
and responsibilities delegated to the Commission under the TEU and the Stability and
Growth Pact (Stability Pact, Pact, SGP). Delegation theory is a useful tool to elucidate
the scope and limits of the Commission’s leadership role in EMU. The Commission’s
potential for leadership or ‘entrepreneurship’ is maintained yet constrained by the
terms of delegation. These terms provided considerable scope for Commission
leadership in Stage II of the EMU project (from 1994) notably in rendering credible
the commitment of member states to the start of Stage III on 1 January 1999 and the
subsequent launch of the euro. Delegation theory can also demonstrate why the
Commission has had difficulty asserting a leadership role since 1999 in the context of
macroeconomic – notably fiscal – policy coordination in EMU and more specifically
with regard to the application of SGP rules. The Commission’s role can be seen
principally in terms of the management and watch-dog functions delegated to it in the
Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. However, the rule book according to which the
Commission must operate in terms of these two functions has been widely criticised –
both by member state governments and the Commission itself.