| Reference : Gesture Politics?: explaining financial regulatory reform in the European Union |
| Scientific journals : Article | |||
| Law, criminology & political science : Political science, public administration & international relations | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17399 | |||
| Gesture Politics?: explaining financial regulatory reform in the European Union | |
| English | |
Howarth, David  [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Language and Literature, Humanities, Arts and Education (FLSHASE) > Identités, Politiques, Sociétés, Espaces (IPSE) >] | |
| Buckley, James [] | |
| 2010 | |
| Journal of Common Market Studies | |
| Blackwell Publishing | |
| 48 | |
| s1 | |
| 119-141 | |
| Yes (verified by ORBilu) | |
| International | |
| 0021-9886 | |
| [en] Financial Regulation ; European Union ; Financial Crisis | |
| [en] We accept the insights from several distinct analytical approaches to
explain national policy-making and EU-level policy. We apply systemic realism and an approach focused upon interest group preferences. We also accept the usefulness of insights drawn from comparative political economy (CPE). We agree with CPE approaches to the extent that they insist that government policies seek to protect national political economies (as in Quaglia, forthcoming). However, we also warn against a CPE approach that relies upon a stagnant understanding of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice, 2001) because such an approach ignores significant changes that have taken place in European financial systems and capitalisms over the past decade (Hancké et al., 2007). We argue that to understand fully the lack of developments on banking regulation at the EU level and EU-level policy co-ordination on international regulation, it is necessary to incorporate other insights, notably from international policy economy (IPE), into an understanding of how national financial systems and economic interests shape national policy. We cannot divorce this study of EU-level responses to the financial crisis from considerations of the obstacles facing financial market integration in the EU. Clearly, support for integration shaped national policymaking on EU-level developments on financial sector matters. However, we argue that integration considerations were secondary. Our focus upon the Member States with the three largest economies and financial sectors – Germany, France and the UK – and the influence of the positions of the financial interests in these countries corresponds to a Liberal Intergovernmentalist (LI) analysis. However, we do not seek to draw broader conclusions about the applicability of LI to explain developments in this policy area. | |
| Researchers ; Professionals ; Students ; General public | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17399 |
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