TorScan: Tracing Long-Lived Connections and Differential Scanning Attacks

BIRYUKOV, Alex; PUSTOGAROV, Ivan; WEINMANN, Ralf-Philipp

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TorScan: Tracing Long-Lived Connections and Differential Scanning Attacks

BIRYUKOV, Alex; PUSTOGAROV, Ivan; WEINMANN, Ralf-Philipp

2012 • In Computer Security - ESORICS 2012 - 17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

Peer reviewed

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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/17074

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Keywords :

Tor; anonymity; privacy; network topology; scan

Abstract :

[en] Tor is a widely used anonymity network providing low-latency communication capabilities. The anonymity provided by Tor heavily relies on the hardness of linking a user’s entry and exit nodes. If an attacker gains access to the topological information about the Tor network instead of having to consider the network as a fully connected graph, this anonymity may be reduced. In fact, we have found ways to probe the connectivity of a Tor relay. We demonstrate how the resulting leakage of the Tor network topology can be used in attacks which trace back a user from an exit relay to a small set of potential entry nodes.

Disciplines :

Computer science

Identifiers :

UNILU:UL-CONFERENCE-2013-074

Author, co-author :

BIRYUKOV, Alex ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)

PUSTOGAROV, Ivan ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)

WEINMANN, Ralf-Philipp ; University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT)

Language :

English

Title :

TorScan: Tracing Long-Lived Connections and Differential Scanning Attacks

Publication date :

2012

Event name :

Computer Security - ESORICS 2012 - 17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

Event place :

Pisa, Italy

Event date :

September 10-12, 2012

Audience :

International

Main work title :

Computer Security - ESORICS 2012 - 17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

Publisher :

Springer

ISBN/EAN :

978-3-642-33166-4

Pages :

469-486

Peer reviewed :

Peer reviewed

Commentary :

7459 ESORICS 2012, Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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since 25 June 2014

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