TorScan: Tracing Long-Lived Connections and Differential Scanning Attacks
English
Biryukov, Alex[University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Pustogarov, Ivan[University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Weinmann, Ralf-Philipp[University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
2012
Computer Security - ESORICS 2012 - 17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Springer
469-486
Yes
International
978-3-642-33166-4
Computer Security - ESORICS 2012 - 17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
[en] Tor is a widely used anonymity network providing low-latency communication capabilities. The anonymity provided by Tor heavily relies on the hardness of linking a user’s entry and exit nodes. If an attacker gains access to the topological information about the Tor network instead of having to consider the network as a fully connected graph, this anonymity may be reduced. In fact, we have found ways to probe the connectivity of a Tor relay. We demonstrate how the resulting leakage of the Tor network topology can be used in attacks which trace back a user from an exit relay to a small set of potential entry nodes.