Reference : Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Multidisciplinary, general & others
Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
Attar, Andrea [IDEI, Université de Toulouse I, France]
Majumdar, Dipjyoti [Concordia University, Canada]
Piaser, Gwenaël [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF)]
Porteiro, Nicolás [Universidad Pablo de Olavide]
Mathematical Social Sciences
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
[en] Revelation principle ; Common agency ; Separable preferences
[en] This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold when finite games with generic payoffs are considered. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals’ payoffs. This provides a rationale for the restriction to direct mechanisms even when competition among principals is considered.

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