Reference : Collusion or Sniping in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions: A Prisoner's Dilemma
Scientific journals : Article
Law, criminology & political science : Multidisciplinary, general & others
Business & economic sciences : Multidisciplinary, general & others
Collusion or Sniping in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions: A Prisoner's Dilemma
Füllbrunn, Sascha [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF)]
International Game Theory Review
World Scientific Publishing Company
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
[en] Collusion ; multi unit auctions ; prisoners's dilemma
[en] In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoner's dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria do not longer exist, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce a further reason for sniping behaviour in Hard Close auctions, i.e. to appear to collude early in the auction and to defect at the very last moment.

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