Two New Techniques of Side-Channel Cryptanalysis

Reference : Two New Techniques of Side-Channel Cryptanalysis


	Document type :	Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
	Discipline(s) :	Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/15032

Title :	Two New Techniques of Side-Channel Cryptanalysis
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Biryukov, Alex [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
	Khovratovich, Dmitry [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Publication date :	2007
Main document title :	Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2007
Pages :	195-208
Peer reviewed :	Yes
Audience :	International
Event name :	Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2007
Event date :	2007
Keywords :	[en] side channel attack ; collision attack ; masking ; AES
Abstract :	[en] We describe two new techniques of side-channel cryptanalysis which we call the impossible collision attack and the multiset collision attack. These are inspired by the state-of-the-art cryptanalytic techniques of impossible differential attacks [BihamBS99] and partial-function collision attacks [GilbertM00] respectively. Using these techniques on an example of the AES we show that one has to mask all the rounds of a 128-bit key AES in order to prevent such attacks. For example these attacks can be used to break a recent proposal by Schramm et al. [SchrammP06] of high order masking for the AES, since it protects only 3 external rounds.
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/10993/15032
DOI :	10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_14
Other URL :	http://www.springerlink.com

File(s) associated to this reference

Fulltext file(s):

	File	Commentary	Version	Size	Access
Open access	two-techniques.pdf	No commentary	Author postprint	221.29 kB	View/Open

All documents in ORBi^lu are protected by a user license.