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Article (Scientific journals)
Delegation and Firms’ Ability to Collude: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?
Guigou, Jean-Daniel
;
de Lamirande, Patrick
;
Lovat, Bruno
2013
•
In
China-USA Business Review
Peer reviewed
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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/14943
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China-USA Business Review 2013 12(1).pdf
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Disciplines :
Finance
Author, co-author :
Guigou, Jean-Daniel
;
University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF)
de Lamirande, Patrick
Lovat, Bruno
Language :
English
Title :
Delegation and Firms’ Ability to Collude: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?
Publication date :
2013
Journal title :
China-USA Business Review
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Available on ORBilu :
since 15 January 2014
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