Composite Procedures in the EU Administrative LAW

Hofmann, Herwig

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Hofmann, Herwig

2009 • In Hofmann, Herwig; Turk, Alexander (Eds.) Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law: The Move to an Integrated Administration

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Keywords :

Composite procedures; EU administrative law; Litigation

Abstract :

[en] Administrative procedures in the sphere of EU law are increasingly integrated. In many cases, both Member State authorities as well as EU institutions and bodies contribute to a single procedure, irrespective of whether the final decision is taken on the national or the European level. Such procedures are referred to here as composite procedures. This chapter is about the legal problems resulting from such procedural administrative integration.

Disciplines :

European & international law

Author, co-author :

Hofmann, Herwig ; University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Law Research Unit

Language :

English

Title :

Composite Procedures in the EU Administrative LAW

Publication date :

2009

Main work title :

Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law: The Move to an Integrated Administration

Editor :

Hofmann, Herwig

Turk, Alexander

Publisher :

Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Unknown/unspecified

Pages :

136-167

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This reality confl icts with a more traditional model of EU administration, often referred to as 'executive federalism', under which administration in the EU had traditionally been understood as a two-level system. In a simplifi ed version of this model, the European level legislates and the Member States implement European policies by national legislative and administrative means. Central to this conception was the distinction between procedures undertaken on the European level on one hand and those by EU Member States on the other hand.
See for the description of the classic model of executive federalism e.g. K. Lenaerts, 'Some Refl ections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community', 28 CMLRev (1991) 11 at 11 ff .
B. Dubey, 'Administration indirecte et fédéralisme d'exécution en Europe', CDE (2003) 87, at 133.
For a view which emphasises the cooperative nature of executive federalism see e.g. P. Dann, 'European Parliament and Executive Federalism: Approaching a Parliament in a Semi-Parliament Democracy', 11 European Law Journal (2003) 549, at 574.
Member States' decisions, under EU law, will often be given eff ect beyond the territory of the issuing state (referred to in what follows as trans-territorialacts). Trans-territorial acts are also often referred to as trans-national acts. The latter term is slightly misleading since it is not the nation which is the relevant point of reference but the fact that generally under public law, due to the principle of territoriality, the legal eff ect of a decision is limited to the territory of the state which issues the decision and the reach of its law. EU law allows for certain acts to have an eff ect beyond this territorial reach within the entire territory of the EU, and in the case of extra-territorial eff ect of an act also beyond the EU.
See for a detailed debate of these distinctions e.g. Kerstin Reinacher, Die Vergemeinschaftung von Verwaltungsverfahren am Beispiel der Freisetzungsrichtlinie, Tenea Verlag (Berlin, 2005).
This indicates the existence of a dichotomy of separation and cooperation. The organizational separation of administrations on the European and on the Member State level is balanced by intensive functional cooperation between the administrations on all levels.
See also Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann, 'Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund und die Rolle des Verwaltungsrechts' in Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann and Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund, Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen, 2005) 1, at page 2.
See with further references and explanations Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander Türk (eds), EU Administrative Governance, Edward Elgar Publishing (Cheltenham, UK, 2006).
Single-case decision making has not been on the agenda of European administrative law research. The reason may be that in recent decades the majority of legal scholars understood the EU in a schematic way as a two-level structure, in which the European level legislates and the Member States implement, a model often referred to as executive federalism. This model has always been a simplifi cation. This simplifi cation has however become increasingly distant from the reality of integrated administrative procedures in the EU.
EU administrative law is understood as the body of law governing administration by EU institutions and bodies as well as Member States' administrations acting within the sphere of EU law, i.e. when either they act to implement EU law or they are bound in their activity by general principles of EU law.
See Article 7 of Council Directive 92/59/EEC of 29 June 1992 on general product safety, OJ 1992 L 228/24.
Directive 98/34/EC of 22 June 1998, OJ 1998 L 204/37 as amended.
Council Regulation No 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorization of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, OJ 1993 L 214/1.
Articles 11, 15 and 18 of Directive 2001/18/EC of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modifi ed organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, OJ 2001 L 106/1.
Art. 13 Directive 97/13/EC of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the fi eld of telecommunications services, OJ 1997 L 117/15.
Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, OJ 2004 L 134/114
Directive 2004/17/EC of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ 2004 L 134/1
Regulation 1564/2005 of
September 2005 establishing standard forms for the publication of notices in the framework of public procurement procedures pursuant to Directives 2004/17/ EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2005 L 257/1.
Council Regulation No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac', for the comparison of fi ngerprints for the eff ective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ 2000 L 316/1.
Council decision of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between fi nancial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information, OJ 2000 L 271/4.
The legal basis of administrative obligations to establish, gather and distribute information arises from general principles of EU law, sometimes expressly established in EU/EC Treaty provisions, as well as, occasionally, in EU/EC legislative acts. The latter are, with few exceptions, policy specifi c. However, certain standard structures to handle information gathering and exchange have been developed, for example by cross-policy provisions on access to documents and data protection.
See e.g. Article 18 of Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 concerning the placing of biocidal products on the market (with amendments), OJ 1998 L 123/1.
See Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients, OJ 1997 L 43/1.
See e.g. Commission Regulation 1085/2003 of 3 June 2003 concerning the examination of variations to the terms of a marketing authorization for medicinal products for human use and veterinary medicinal products falling within the scope of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93, OJ 2003 L 159/24.
With the request for authorization and the subsequent administrative decisions, the party requesting the authorization - an individual or a public body - will be required to provide more or less substantive information on the planned project. A second step is often the coordination with other Member States or the continuation of the procedure by an EU agency or institution.
See e.g. Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients, OJ 1997 L 43/1.
See e.g. Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, OJ 1996 L 257/26.
Member States are, where there is no harmonization of law, in some policy areas encouraged to regulate the specifi cs of horizontal mutual assistance inagreements or 'common accords' amongst themselves. This is explicitly established e.g. in the rules on customs law in Article 47 of Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters, OJ 1997 L 82/1, stating that 'Member States may decide by common accord whether procedures are needed to ensure the smooth operation of the mutual-assistance arrangements provided for in this Regulation .' In the area of tax law a similar provision exists in Article 38 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 on administrative cooperation in the fi eld of value added tax and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 218/92, OJ 2003 L 264/1 according to which the competent authorities can agree on the language to be used for requests and acts of mutual assistance.
See further F. Wettner, 'Das allgemeine Verfahrensrecht der gemeinschaftlichen Amtshilfe', in Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann and Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen, 2005) 181-212.
The rules on mutual assistance have developed 'in sync.' with the general development of the EU legal system. Originally, the vertical relation was stressed with the obligations laid down in what is now Article 10 EC, the duty of loyal cooperation. Then, in the phase of the development of single market-related case law by the ECJ in the 1970s the focus also turned to horizontal cooperation between administrations for exchange of information on the admission of certain products on the market (see e.g. Case 35/76, Simmental I [1976] ECR 1871 and Case 251/78, Denkavit I [1979] ECR 3369). Finally, after cautious beginnings in the late 1970s with certain directives on mutual assistance obligations these obligations of mutual assistance in the network of administrations have been regulated to great detail in legal acts in diff erent policy areas.
An example is the provisions in tax law. The Council Directive 77/799/EEC concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the fi eld of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336/15) had provided for vertical and horizontal mutual assistance but had also begun to develop the notion of mutual assistance without a prior request by the administration of another Member State and the sharing of information directly on the level of the agencies involved. CouncilRegulation 1798/2003 on administrative cooperation in the fi eld of value added tax (OJ 2003 L 264/1), for example still contains rules on individual cases of information sharing through mutual assistance. Generally however, a network structure for information sharing is established in its Articles 5 and 17 of Reg. 1798/2003.
However, the existence and maintenance of information networks between diff erent levels of administration are not entirely dependent on a European agency. Examples of such networks based directly on horizontal cooperation between Member States on the basis of EU legal provisions are for example prominent in the areas in which Member States are highly protective of their rights such as tax law (in tax law, for example, the area of the joint administration of the socalled 'value added tax' is subject to regulation. The relevant regulation creates a 'common communication network (CCN) and common system interface (CSI)' to ensure all transmissions by electronic means between competent authorities in the area of customs and taxation. Article 39 Council Regulation 1798/2003 on administrative cooperation in the fi eld of value added tax, OJ 2003 L 264/1) and asylum and immigration provisions. The Shengen Information System (SIS), the main purpose of which is to centralize and supply information on non-EU citizens to EU Member States' authorities is supplemented by the 'SIRENE' database, which permits the exchange of additional information, such as fi ngerprints and photographs. The SIS II database is designed to be capable of working with an enlarged EU.
See also Council Decision 512/2004/EC establishing the Visa Information System (VIS) [2004] OJ L 213/5.
Generally, secondary legislation establishing information networks also contains rules on mutual assistance for supply of information upon specifi c request.
See for example Articles 5-8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 of
October 2003 on administrative cooperation in the fi eld of value added tax and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 218/92, OJ 2003 L 264/1.
Information networks are either established as centralized databases administered on the Community level, e.g. by an agency or they can also be organized as networks of networks, i.e. structures on the European level, linking pre-existing or newly established databases on the Member State level (e.g. the CCN/CSI network in the area of tax law, linking national databases under Article 39 Council Regulation 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 on administrative cooperation in the fi eld of value added tax and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 218/92, OJ 2003 L 264/1). In many policy areas, information networks are established and coordinatedby a European agency. Some of the most typical examples of these information networks arise in the area of European environmental law. The European Environment Information and Observation Network (Eionet) (based on Council Regulation 1210/90 of 7 May 1990, OJ 1990 L 120/1 and Council Regulation 933/99 of 29 April 1999, OJ 1999 L 117/1, amending Regulation 1210/90 on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the European environment information and observation network), for example, is a partnership network between the European Environment Agency and its national partner agencies (of EU and non-EU states) as well as private actors in participating countries.
Directive 2002/3/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2002 relating to ozone in ambient air, OJ 2002 L 67/14 which in Article
contains an information obligation both in the vertical and the horizontal direction for joint planning networks for cases of trans-boundary ozone pollution.
Articles 150-152 of the Council Directive 89/608/EEC on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of legislation on veterinary and zootechnical matters, OJ 1989 L 351/34.
See also with respect to rules on mutual assistance both horizontally and vertically Regulation 882/2004 on offi cial controls performed to ensure the verifi cation of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules, OJ 2004 L 165/1 corrected in OJ 2004 L 191/1. The EFSA has the ability to add scientifi c expertise helping the Member States assess the risk and the necessary measures to counter that risk. Other risk regulation-related policy areas with information networks managed by European agencies include maritime safety (Directive 2002/59/EC establishing a Community vessel traffi c monitoring and information system, OJ 2002 L 208/10). The network is maintained essentially with the help of an agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency. Information exchange within this network importantly is established directly between costal authorities of the Member States.
See also the information networks established and maintained on drugs and drug addiction as well as xenophobia and racism (Article 4 of Regulation 1035/97 establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, OJ 1997 L 151/1).
Such powers diff er from the obligation to provide for mutual assistance by the fact that mutual assistance is generally on an ad hoc basis and is undertaken under the rules of procedure of the administrations 'giving' the information.
This is an exceptional arrangement for example in the area of supervision of banking and fi nancial institutions: see Article 43 (1) of Directive 2006/48/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ 2006 L 177/1 (which replaced Directive 2000/12/EC).
It may conduct internal investigations in Community institutions and bodies as well as 'external' investigations in Member States or, under certain circumstances, in non-EU states. Its powers are established in a regulation, detailing the procedural rights and obligations of European and Member State institutions in relation to OLAF investigations (see Regulation 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Offi ce (OLAF), OJ 1999 L 136/1). These rules include the obligation to exchange relevant information and the ability of OLAF to forward information or requests for action to Member States' authorities.
In anti-trust proceedings, for example, these can be as far-reaching as those conferred under Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003, which allows the Commission to enter into investigations as to the market situation in entire sectors of the economy and into categories of agreements between private parties: Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1/1.
Based on Council Regulation 1210/90, OJ 1990 L 120/1 and Council Regulation 933/99, OJ 1999 L 117/1, amending Regulation 1210/90 on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the European environment information and observation network.
Article 8 (4) of Council Regulation 1210/90, OJ 1990 L 120/1 and Council Regulation 933/99, OJ 1999 L 117/1, amending Regulation 1210/90.
Control of compliance with EU law by individuals and Member States may also be investigated jointly as e.g. the Commission's 'on-site monitoring' shows.
See for the area of state aid control Article 22 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article
of the EC Treaty, OJ 1999 L 83/1.
For the competence of an agency to undertake investigations itself in the Member States see e.g. Article 2(b)(i) of Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, OJ 2002 L 208/1, under which the Agency shall 'monitor the overall functioning of the Community port State control regime, which may include visits to the Member States, and suggest to the Commission any possible improvements in that fi eld'.
Generally, they will have to inform the relevant Member States' authorities about their intention, and these in turn have the duty loyally to cooperate.
See for many, e.g., Article 20(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on substances which deplete the ozone layer, OJ 2000 L 244/1 as amended: '2. When requesting information from an undertaking the Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of the request to the competent authority of the Member State within the territory of which the undertaking's seat is situated, together with a statement of the reasons why that information is required'.
See e.g. in the area of agricultural law, Article 7(2), (3) and (4) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2729/2000 of 14 December 2000 laying down detailed implementing rules on controls in the wine sector, OJ 2000 L 316/16.
The secondary legislation in the area of food safety, also in reaction to the BSE crisis, is probably the most detailed in nature, frequency and standard as wellas fi nancing of controls by national authorities to ensure Community-wide safety standards (Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on offi cial controls performed to ensure the verifi cation of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules, OJ 2004 L 165/1).
An example is Article 10(3) of Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ 1999 L 83/1. Injunctions are permitted only where a specifi c legal basis for their use exists. Sanctioning of violations of rights of inspection within this system is generally undertaken under the law of the Member States (Article 9 of Regulation 2185/96 concerning on-thespot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities' fi nancial interests, OJ 1996 L 292/2), which are obliged to provide for eff ective and equivalent protection of EU law through their national legal systems. Important exceptions exist in competition law enforcement: for anti-trust under Regulation 1/2003 (OJ 2004 L 1/1), the Commission has extensive rights to sanction violations under EC law and in the area of state aid control, the Commission has 'fast track access' to the infringement procedure under Article 23 of Regulation 659/1999 combined with the right to use best available information (e.g. Article 18(1) of Regulation 384/96 on protection against dumped imports, OJ 1996 L 56/1, as amended by Regulation 2117/2005, OJ 2005 L 340/17).
Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, [1987] OJ L 197/33 and Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, [1999] OJ L 184/23. Decision 2006/512/EC, OJ 2006 L /11.
For a discussion of this pre-2006 development see C.F. Bergström, Comitology: Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the Committee System, OUP (Oxford 2005).
For a discussion of the post-2006 development see Manuel Szapiro in this volume.
Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ 2001 L 8/1.
See for the EC Regulation 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ 2001 L 145/43.
Deidre Curtin, 'Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account' (2007) 13 European Law Journal 523, at 540: '[o]ne of the main problems regarding the checks and balances under construction in the "undergrowth" of legal and institutional practice is the chronic lack of transparency of the overall system. It is not that there is no public accountability it is rather that it is not visible and often not structured very clearly'.
For further discussion see e.g. Kerstin Reinacher, Die Vergemeinschaftung von Verwaltungsverfahren am Beispiel der Freisetzungsrichtlinie, Tenea Verlag (Berlin, 2005), 96-98.
The language regime is only one of the aspects of the structure. One of the essential rights of citizens in the EU is to communicate with institutions and bodies of the EU in their language and to obtain a copy of all rules and single-case decisions aff ecting them directly or indirectly in their language. With a decentralized administration in the EU which takes decisions and issues acts with transterritorial eff ect, this general right is limited to the language of the issuing country. Given that for example a decision of the Latvian administration will be able to take eff ect vis-a`-vis individuals in Greece and the number of Latvian speakers in Greece will most likely be very limited, the dimension of the problem should become very clear. Responsibility for an act is also diffi cult to establish from outside a legal system, especially in countries with a diff erent legal system. Federally organized states like, for example, Belgium and Germany have complex rules of responsibility internally
a structure like the Swedish model of agencies might be diff erent from that in countries with a more hierarchic internal organization.
For further detailed analysis see the excellent analysis by S. Cassese, 'European Administrative Proceedings' (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 21.
See Case T-188/97 Rothmans v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2463. The Community judge here faces similar problems to those of a judge of a Member State court when reviewing administrative procedures with several agencies involved and complex structures of internal interaction.
When looking at these examples, it has to be noted that their existence as leading case law deters many cases from being brought to the ECJ and CFI and they thus remain buried in the national case law, if they get litigated at all.
A similar case with the same constellation of cooperation between national authorities and the Commission in the meat market was decided by the CFI in the same vein. Preparatory decisions by national authorities for a fi nal marketing authorization of beef by the Commission could be reviewed only in national courts.
See Joined Cases C-106/90, C-317/90 and C-129/91, Emerald Meats v. Commission [1993] ECR I-209.
See Türk in this volume.
Joined Cases 106-107/63, Toepfer v. Commission [1965] ECR 405.
In 2005 the European Ombudsman submitted a special report to the European Parliament with the recommendation that OLAF should acknowledge that it had made incorrect and misleading statements in its submissions to the Ombudsman.
This took place on the basis of Article 10(2) of Regulation 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Offi ce (OLAF), OJ 1999 L 136/1.
App. No. 20477/05 Tillack v. Belgium, judgment of 27 November 2007.
This old-fashioned conceptual approach has been heavily criticized in the literature: see e.g. Jens Hofmann, Rechtsschutz und Haftung im Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund, Duncker & Humblot (Berlin, 2004), 163-182
Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann, Das Allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee, 2nd edition, Springer (Berlin, 2004), 336-338.
The decision to distribute information on the other hand can be subject to a procedure under Article 230 EC: see Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 European Parliament v. Council and Commission [2006] ECR I-4721.
An example is the listing of an individual in the Schengen Information System by a Member State administration, which may lead to him or her being refused to travel into or within the Schengen area. On this with references in German and French case law see Jens Hofmann, Rechtsschutz und Haftung im Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund, Duncker & Humblot (Berlin, 2004), 283, 284.
Often the publication of damaging information can constitute a serious breach of an individual's rights independently of the serious nature of the breach of a duty by the simple fact that the information is wrong. It is thus not inconceivable that such a situation will leave an individual without legal protection. This situation may easily amount to a violation of the principle of eff ective legal protection.
This proposal adopted here for the problems of composite procedures was developed in detail for cases of legislative failure by Nicholas Forwood, prior to his becoming Judge at the CFI. Judge Forwood wishes to stress that his comments were made in his function as a practising lawyer many years ago and cannot be regarded as the comments of a judge speaking extra-judicially: see Nicholas Forwood, 'Judicial Protection of the Individual - 10 Years of the Court of First Instance', in Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes (ed.), Le Tribunal de Premie`re Instance des Communautés Européennes 1989-1999,Offi ce for Offi cial Publications (Luxembourg, 2000) 56-66.
The standard for awarding damages to date however is stricter than simple illegality of an executive action. The ECJ consistently requires not just illegality but a 'suffi ciently serious' breach of Community law in order to award damages. Where an administration enjoys a margin of discretion, simple illegality of information exchange can however breach an individual's rights to a considerable degree and merit declaration without the award of damages. Expanding the right to damages claims would allow for review of non-fi nal acts and ensure a higher level of supervision and protection of rights in a network administration.
The latter functional defi nition has for example been chosen for defi ning the reach of European fundamental rights. Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, for example, explicitly includes obligations to observe EU fundamental rights by Member States' agencies when they are 'implementing Union law'.
For a detailed description see Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, 'Promoting Accountability in Multi-Level Governance: A Network Approach', European Governance Papers No. C-06-02, 19-27, available at www.connex-network. org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-02.pdf.
According to the EO annual report for 2006, 127, '[t]he European Network of Ombudsmen consists of almost 90 offi ces in 31 European countries. Within the Union, it covers the ombudsmen and similar bodies at the European, national, and regional levels, while at the national level, it also includes Norway, Iceland, and the applicant countries for EU membership. Each of the national ombudsmen and similar bodies in the EU Member States, as well as in Norway and Iceland, has appointed a liaison offi cer to act as a point of contact for other members of the Network.'
Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ 2001 L 8/1.
This network includes data protection authorities in charge of matters of the second and third pillars of the EU as well as diff erent Member States' data protection authorities.
Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson, 'Re-conceptualising Europeanisation as a Public Law of Collisions: Comitology, Agencies and an Interactive Public Adjudication', in Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander Türk (eds), EU Administrative Governance, Edward Elgar Publishing (Cheltenham, 2006), 512.