Article (Scientific journals)
Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains
Irmen, Andreas
1998In Journal of Economic Surveys, 12 (4), p. 333-59
Peer reviewed
 

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Keywords :
Vertical Restraints; Contract Theory; Vertical Separation
Abstract :
[en] The design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization. Hence, it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices. A precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players' expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one's own favor (Schelling, 1960). How these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Disciplines :
Macroeconomics & monetary economics
Author, co-author :
Irmen, Andreas  ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA)
Language :
English
Title :
Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains
Publication date :
1998
Journal title :
Journal of Economic Surveys
Volume :
12
Issue :
4
Pages :
333-59
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Available on ORBilu :
since 28 November 2013

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