Reference : Property Rights, Optimal Public Enforcement, and Growth
Reports : External report
Business & economic sciences : Macroeconomics & monetary economics
Property Rights, Optimal Public Enforcement, and Growth
Irmen, Andreas mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Kuehnel, Johanna [> >]
CESifo Group Munich
[en] technological change; economic development; property rights; public employment
[en] We study the link between public enforcement of property rights, innovation investments, and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product varieties. We find that a government may assure positive equilibrium growth through public employment in the enforcement of property rights, if the economic environment is sufficiently favorable to growth and/or public enforcement is sufficiently effective. However, in terms of welfare an equilibrium path without property rights protection and growth might be preferable. In this case the enforcement of property rights involves too much reallocation of labor from production and research towards the public sector.
Researchers ; Students
CESifo Working Paper Series

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