Paper published in a book (Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings)
Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue
Coron, Jean-Sébastien; Christophe, Giraud; Emmanuel, Prouff et al.
2012In Proceedings of COSADE 2012
Peer reviewed
 

Files


Full Text
cosade12.pdf
Publisher postprint (354.28 kB)
Download

All documents in ORBilu are protected by a user license.

Send to



Details



Abstract :
[en] To guarantee the security of a cryptographic implementation against Side Channel Attacks, a common approach is to formally prove the security of the corresponding scheme in a model as pertinent as possible. Nowadays, security proofs for masking schemes in the literature are usually conducted for models where only the manipulated data are assumed to leak. However in practice, the leakage is better modeled encompassing the memory transitions as e.g. the Hamming distance model. From this observation, a natural question is to decide at which extent a countermeasure proved to be secure in the first model stays secure in the second. In this paper, we look at this issue and we show that it must definitely be taken into account. Indeed, we show that a countermeasure proved to be secure against second-order side-channel attacks in the first model becomes vulnerable against a first-order side-channel attack in the second model. Our result emphasize the issue of porting an implementation from devices leaking only on the manipulated data to devices leaking on the memory transitions.
Disciplines :
Computer science
Identifiers :
UNILU:UL-CONFERENCE-2012-399
Author, co-author :
Coron, Jean-Sébastien ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Christophe, Giraud;  Oberthur Technologies, France
Emmanuel, Prouff;  Oberthur Technologies, France
Soline, Renner;  Oberthur Technologies, France
Matthieu, Rivain;  CryptoExperts, France
Praveen Kumar, Vadnala ;  University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC)
Language :
English
Title :
Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue
Publication date :
2012
Event name :
Third InternationalWorkshop, COSADE 2012
Event place :
Darmstadt, Germany
Event date :
May 3-4, 2012
Main work title :
Proceedings of COSADE 2012
Publisher :
Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012
ISBN/EAN :
978-3-642-29911-7
Pages :
69-81
Peer reviewed :
Peer reviewed
Commentary :
7275/2012 Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Available on ORBilu :
since 12 November 2013

Statistics


Number of views
79 (8 by Unilu)
Number of downloads
225 (4 by Unilu)

Scopus citations®
 
50
Scopus citations®
without self-citations
46

Bibliography


Similar publications



Contact ORBilu